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ESSAY
TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
OF THE POISON PILL
Lucian A. Bebchuk* & RobertJ Jackson, Jr.**
We argue that the state-law rules governing poison pills are vul-
nerable to challenges based on preemption by the Williams Act. Such
challenges, we show, could well have a major impact on the corporate-
law landscape.
The Williams Act established a federal regime regulating unsolic-
ited tender offers, but states subsequently developed a body of state anti-
takeover laws that impose additional impediments to such offers. In a
series of well-known cases during the 1970s and 1980s, the federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, held some of these state antitake-
over laws preempted by the Williams Act. To date, however, federal
courts and commentators have paid little attention to the possibility that
the state-law rules authorizing the use of poison pills-the most power-
ful impediment to outside buyers of shares-are also preempted.
Our study examines this subject and concludes that there is a sub-
stantial basis for questioning the continued validity of current state-law
rules authorizing the use of poison pills. The Essay shows that these
rules now impose tighter restrictions on unsolicited offers than those
once imposed by state antitakeover regulations that the federal courts
invalidated on preemption grounds. Preemption challenges to these
poison-pill rules could well result in their invalidation by the federal
courts.
Finally, we discuss how state lawmakers could revise poison-pill
rules to make them more likely to survive a federal preemption chal-
lenge. This could be done, we show, by imposing substantial limits on
the length of time during which a poison pill can be used to block tender
offers. Whether preemption challenges lead to invalidation of existing
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poison-pill state rules or to their substantial modification, such chal-
lenges could well reshape the market for corporate control.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly all standard corporate-law casebooks include an account of
the significant line of cases in which the federal courts reviewed the con-
stitutionality1 of state antitakeover statutes. These textbooks, however, go
1. As we explain below, as a formal matter these courts considered whether the
Williams Act preempts state antitakeover statutes-and, thus, whether such statutes are
rendered void by operation of the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This
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on to express the accepted view among researchers and practitioners that
these cases are no longer practically relevant to contemporary corporate
law, because a private-law innovation-the poison pill-now dominates
the antitakeover influence of state statutes. 2 In this Essay, we argue that
this widely shared view is mistaken.'
We show that the cases in which the federal courts have evaluated
the constitutionality of state antitakeover statutes raise serious questions
about the validity of the state-law rules authorizing the use of the poison
pill. The Essay presents a systematic analysis of the possibility that these
rules are preempted by the Williams Act and provides a framework for
assessing preemption challenges to those rules. Litigation over the valid-
ity of these rules, we show, could have profound implications for the gov-
ernance of American corporations.
The literature on the constitutionality of state antitakeover laws is
quite substantial. Indeed, more than one hundred law review articles
have considered whether and how the Williams Act might preempt vari-
ous state statutes that govern corporate takeovers. 4 Just four years ago,
the Business Lawyer dedicated a symposium issue to analysis of whether
the Williams Act preempts Delaware's business-combination statute. 5 Yet
Constitution and the Laws of the United States... shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land ...."); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78-87 (1987)
(applying Supremacy Clause to state-law rules governing hostile takeovers); Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630-39 (1982) (White,J.) (same). For ease of exposition, in this Essay
we occasionally refer to the invalidation of state law by operation of the Supremacy Clause
as rendering such laws "unconstitutional."
2. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Guhan Subramanian,
Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization 588-97 (3d ed. 2009)
(noting, in the course of describing the emergence of state antitakeover statutes and cases
addressing their constitutional validity, that "poison pills were [instead] the decisive legal
development of the hostile takeover era"); Melvin Aron Eisenberg & James D. Cox,
Corporations and Other Business Organizations: Cases and Materials 1343 (10th ed. 2011)
(emphasizing, during discussion of these cases, emergence of the poison pill).
3. This Essay continues our recent work considering the interplay of federal
constitutional law and state corporate-law rules. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J.
Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 83-85 (2010)
[hereinafter Bebchuk & Jackson, Corporate Political Speech] (arguing that recent
developments in federal constitutional law highlight the need for changes in state-law
rules governing corporations' political speech decisions); Lucian A. Bebchuk & RobertJ.
Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 Geo. L.J. 923, 949-53
(2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Jackson, Shining Light] (arguing that the Securities and
Exchange Commission should adopt rules requiring disclosure of corporate spending on
politics).
4. For examples from this literature, see infra note 57 and accompanying text
(discussing Westlaw search yielding 191 such articles published since 1982).
5. See Guhan Subramanian, Steven Herscovici & Brian Barbetta, Is Delaware's
Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence from 1988-2008, 65 Bus. Law. 685, 686-
88 (2010) [hereinafter Subramanian, Herscovici & Barbetta, Is Delaware's Antitakeover
Statute Unconstitutional?] (examining whether Delaware's antitakeover law is vulnerable
to federal preemption because it denies bidders "meaningful opportunity for success").
The symposium included several responses to this important article. See infra note 46.
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this large literature has paid limited attention to the question whether
the state-law rules with the most powerful antitakeover effect-the rules
authorizing use of the poison pill-are preempted.
In this Essay, we systematically analyze this question and conclude
that there is substantial doubt as to whether current state-law poison-pill
rules are valid. As we explain, these rules provide incumbents with an
even more powerful antitakeover defense-and impose an even lengthier
delay on tender offerors-than the state statutes that the federal courts
have held to be invalid. The validity of state-law poison-pill rules thus
should not be taken for granted, and we provide a framework for analyz-
ing preemption challenges to these rules.
Using this framework, we discuss three alternative approaches that
the federal courts may follow when faced with preemption challenges to
the validity of state-law rules governing poison pills. This analysis shows
that the courts are likely to conclude that existing state-law poison-pill
rules are preempted. This Essay also examines what changes in existing
state-law rules might make them more likely to survive constitutional
scrutiny. We show that state corporate law that substantially limits the
length of time during which a poison pill can be used to delay tender
offers would be significantly more likely to withstand a preemption chal-
lenge than current state-law rules in this area.
The remainder of the Essay proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the
Williams Act and the emergence of state antitakeover laws after the Act's
passage. 6 This Part also discusses the large body of cases in which the
courts have considered whether the Act preempts state antitakeover stat-
utes. The Essay explains that, despite this long line of cases, the federal
courts have paid limited attention to the possibility that poison-pill rules
are preempted by the Williams Act.
Part II discusses the legal landscape that the drafters of the Williams
Act faced when they passed the Act in 1968. This landscape was funda-
6. As one of us has shown in a series of articles, the evolution of state antitakeover law
has been influenced by incumbents' interest in having more extensive protections from
unsolicited tender offers than the Williams Act provided. Articles analyzing how states'
antitakeover rules have been influenced by incumbents' preference for antitakeover
protection include Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Takeover Law:
The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1168, 1172-76 (1999);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1458-83 (1992); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 57 Bus. Law.
1047, 1049-59 (2002). A formal model of this subject is developed in Oren Bar-Gill,
Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. Institutional &
Theoretical Econ. 134, 134-38 (2006). For empirical evidence that states providing strong
antitakeover protections are more successful in attracting incorporations, see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & Econ. 383,
413-17 (2003). The empirical evidence on this subject is also reviewed and discussed in
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition
in Corporate Law?, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1775, 1806-20 (2002).
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mentally altered by the emergence of state-law poison-pill rules that allow
incumbents to delay tender offers for lengthy periods of time. Indeed, we
explain, those rules provide incumbents with an even more powerful
antitakeover defense-and impose an even lengthier delay-than the
state statute that the Supreme Court invalidated as preempted by the
Williams Act. Thus, we argue, the constitutional validity of current state-
law rules governing poison pills should not be taken for granted.
Some prior work on the validity of state antitakeover laws has noted
that poison pills are private contractual arrangements, suggesting that
pills are thereby distinguishable from the state antitakeover laws that
have been held preempted by the Williams Act.7 In Part II, we explain
that this view overlooks the critical role that state-law rules play in ena-
bling poison pills to delay tender offers for lengthy periods of time-a
result in considerable tension with the Williams Act. Furthermore, some
of the state antitakeover laws that were invalidated by the federal courts
blocked only unsolicited offers that incumbent directors choose to
oppose-just as current state-law poison-pill rules do. The federal courts
considering preemption challenges to those state antitakeover laws have
not suggested that the presence of a private choice by directors precludes
a preemption challenge to the state laws making that private choice pos-
sible. To the contrary, we explain, these courts proceeded to consider
whether the challenged state law was consistent with the Williams Act.
8
Part III provides a comprehensive analysis of how courts can be
expected to approach preemption challenges to state-law poison-pill
rules. We examine in Part III the three approaches that federal courts
have followed in the past in evaluating claims that the Williams Act
preempts state antitakeover laws, and we analyze the expected conse-
quences that would follow if each approach were applied to current state-
law poison-pill rules. The first judicial approach we consider focuses on
whether tender offerors are given a meaningful opportunity to succeed
in obtaining control of the target and whether shareholders are given an
opportunity to evaluate the merits of tender offers. We show that if this
approach were applied to current state-law poison-pill rules, the courts
would likely conclude that these rules are per se preempted.
Next, Part III considers judicial approaches from prior cases on
Williams Act preemption that have focused on whether, in fact, the state
law at issue enhances investor protection. We show that, if this approach
is followed in an examination of the validity of current state-law poison-
7. See, e.g., Subramanian, Herscovici & Barbetta, Is Delaware's Antitakeover Statute
Unconstitutional?, supra note 5, at 711 (noting that the poison pill is private-law
innovation requiring affirmative action by the board of directors, and hence may be
distinguishable from state antitakeover statutes that the federal courts have held
unconstitutional). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption as Micromanagement, 65 Bus.
Law. 789, 792-96 (2010) (stating that attempts to distinguish the poison pill on this basis
are, "at best, shaky").
8. See infra text accompanying notes 83-94.
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pill rules, courts will be required to hold evidentiary hearings to deter-
mine whether current state-law poison-pill rules do in fact enhance
shareholder value. We explain that, given existing evidence that the
agency-cost effects of managerial entrenchment might impose significant
costs on investors, this approach might well also result in the invalidation
of current state-law poison-pill rules.
Third, we consider an approach drawn from prior cases in which the
federal courts have opined that the Williams Act preempts only state laws
that conflict directly with the procedures mandated by the Act. If a court
facing a preemption challenge to the validity of state-law poison-pill rules
were to follow this approach, it would likely hold that these rules are per
se valid. While we discuss this possibility, we provide reasons to believe
that this approach is unlikely to carry the day among federal courts, and
most importantly the Supreme Court, if those courts are faced with
preemption challenges to state-law poison-pill rules.9
Once state lawmakers recognize that current state-law poison-pill
rules may be preempted, they may wish to take steps to avoid that result.
Thus, in Part IV, we provide a framework for lawmakers considering
changes to state law designed to avoid preemption. Because the federal
courts have emphasized the length of the delay that state-law rules
impose on unsolicited tender offers, this Essay explains, the risk of
preemption may be considerably reduced by substantially limiting the
period of time during which incumbents may use a poison pill to block
tender offers they disfavor. While such revisions might ensure the survival
9. In response to the arguments advanced in this Essay, five senior partners of the law
firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, including founding partner Martin Lipton, issued
a twelve-page, single-spaced memorandum arguing that "there has never been any doubt,
and never will be," that state-law rules authorizing the poison pill are consistent with the
Williams Act. Martin Lipton, A Response to Bebchuk andJackson's Toward a Constitutional
Review of the Poison Pill, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corporate Governance & Fin.
Regulation (Mar. 13, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://blogs.law. harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/03/
13/a-response-to-bebchuk-and-jacksons-toward-a-constitufional-review-of-the-poison-pill/
[hereinafter Wachtell Response] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The Wachtell
Response relies upon the cases noted above, which suggest that the Williams Act preempts
only state-law rules that conflict directly with the procedures proscribed by the Act, and
asserts that these cases reflect the "true state of the law." Id. In a detailed reply to the
Wachtell Response, we explain that this assertion is unwarranted. See Lucian Bebchuk &
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill: A Reply to
Wachtell Lipton, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corporate Governance & Fin. Regulation
(Mar. 17, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/03/17/toward-a-constitu
tional-review-of-the-poison-pill-a-reply-to-wachtell-lipton [hereinafter Forum Reply] (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
As the Forum Reply explains, the Wachtell Response does not provide an accurate
description of the state of the law in this area. The Wachtell Response gives little weight to,
and occasionally fails even to acknowledge, the federal-court decisions noted above and
described in further detail in this Essay, see infra Part III.A-B, that have concluded that
the Williams Act's preemptive scope is far broader than the Wachtell Response suggests. In
the Forum Reply and in this Essay, we show that the approaches taken by these courts
would likely lead judges to conclude that current state-law poison-pill rules are preempted.
1554 [Vol. 114:1549
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of some state-law poison-pill rules, they would bring about a major
change in the mergers-and-acquisitions landscape and the governance of
public companies.
Before proceeding, we note that some might question our assertion
that state-law poison-pill rules may well be preempted on the ground that
litigation based on such a claim has not yet been aggressively pursued.
But it is not uncommon for claims that were ultimately successful in the
federal courts to be brought after a long period of time during which
they were not raised-even when the stakes have been significant, and
the potential litigants have had substantial resources. For example, for
decades well-counseled corporations defended claims under the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) based on events occurring outside the United States
without arguing that the statute did not confer jurisdiction over such
claims.1" Yet the Supreme Court recently declared that the ATS does not
provide jurisdiction over such claims-an argument that had not been
raised by either the corporations or the courts during the many years in
which cases in this area had been litigated.11 Similarly, companies have
been defending ATS suits for many years without arguing that the statute
does not reach the conduct of private corporations. 12 Yet the Second
Circuit, home to many such suits, recently held that corporations cannot
be held liable under the statute at all.'" Thus, the fact that a preemption
10. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla.
2003) (describing claims against Coca-Cola based solely on events in Colombia and
explaining that, although Coca-Cola succeeded in having the claims dismissed, the
company did not argue that the statute did not confer jurisdiction over claims based on
those events); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432-34 (D.N.J. 1999)
(same, with respect to claims against Ford based on events in Germany during World War
II).
11. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668-69 (2013)
(stating that ATS presumptively does not apply extraterritorially); see also Alan 0. Sykes,
Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute and Beyond: An
Economic Analysis, 100 Geo. L.J. 2161, 2178 (2012) ("Most ATS actions to date have
involved conduct within foreign nations .... [M]ost lower courts [and litigants] have
simply assumed that such conduct is covered by the statute.").
12. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (allowing
suit to proceed against corporation without expressly addressing whether corporations, as
opposed to natural persons, could be held liable under ATS). See generally Julian G. Ku,
The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of
Judicial Lawmaking, 51 Va. J. Int'l L. 353, 354-55 (2011) ("For over two decades, U.S.
courts have held that private corporations... can be subject to lawsuits under the [ATS].
This approach... was so widely accepted that courts barely acknowledged the issue when
deciding on cases involving corporate defendants." (footnote omitted)).
13. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010)
("Corporate liability, however, is simply not 'accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms' recognized as
providing a basis for suit under the law prescribed by the ATS-that is, customary
international law." (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004))), aff'd on
other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659. But see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding that corporations can be held liable under ATS), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995
(2013) (mem.); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir.
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challenge to state-law poison-pill rules has not yet been fully litigated
should not lead one to presume that such a challenge would be unlikely
to succeed. Indeed, as we explain below, there is a substantial basis for
concluding that such a challenge would have a substantial likelihood of
being accepted by the courts.
14
While the literature on the constitutionality of state antitakeover law
is rather extensive, this work, like previous case law, has paid insufficient
attention to whether the Williams Act also preempts state-law poison-pill
rules. In this Essay, we provide a framework for future consideration of
this issue. In our view, constitutional litigation over the subject may well
have a transformative effect on the modern law of mergers and acquisi-
tions and the corporate-governance landscape.
In particular, state-law poison-pill rules currently give incumbents a
powerful means of blocking unsolicited offers to acquire the firm. As a
result, the market for corporate control is significantly weaker than it
would be if courts concluded that the Williams Act limits the scope of
those rules. Of course, corporate-law commentators have widely varying
views about whether a more robust market for corporate control would
be beneficial for investors. Some have argued that lowering antitakeover
barriers and strengthening the market for control would benefit inves-
tors by reducing agency costs and managerial slack, providing incum-
bents with powerful ex ante incentives to maximize the value of the
firm.'5 Others worry that a stronger market for control might lead incum-
bent managers to pursue short-term profits at the expense of more pro-
ductive long-term investments. 6 Notwithstanding the divergence of views
2011) (same); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same);
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303,1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (same).
14. In a recent article, Professor Guhan Subramanian quotes this paragraph of this
Essay and expresses agreement with our argument that the validity of state-law poison-pill
rules should not be inferred from the lack of challenges over a long period of time. See
Guhan Subramanian, Delaware's Choice: A Brief Reply to Commentators, 39 Del. J. Corp.
L. 85, 89 (2014) (referring to our example as "powerful" and agreeing with our
observation that "an unconstitutional [state law] can survive for decades without
constitutional challenge").
15. For articles arguing that strong antitakeover impediments are undesirable, see,
for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers,
69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973, 993 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto],
and Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); see also Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence & Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 950-51 (2002)
[hereinafter Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, Powerful Antitakeover Force]. For
empirical studies providing evidence that takeover defenses are associated with lower firm
value, see, for example, Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?,
22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 783, 823 (2009), and Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and
Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. Econ. 107, 107 (2003), which find that stronger shareholder rights
are associated with higher firm value.
16. For articles taking this view, see Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101, 104 (1979) [hereinafter Lipton, Takeover Bids], and Martin
1556 [Vol. 114:1549
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concerning whether state-law poison-pill rules are beneficial or detri-
mental for investors, all should agree that constitutional litigation that
invalidates those rules, or imposes substantial limits on the poison-pill
rules that states may have, would have a profound effect on corporate
law.
In particular, such litigation would have a meaningful effect on the
operation of the market for corporate control and the incidence of mer-
gers and acquisitions. It would, in turn, also influence how the prospect
of an unsolicited offer affects the ongoing management decisions of
incumbent directors and managers. In this Essay, we provide a frame-
work for assessing constitutional challenges to current state-law poison-
pill rules and explain why courts may well conclude that those rules are
invalid.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF STATE ANTITAKEOVER LAW
In this Part, we introduce the law governing constitutional review of
state antitakeover rules. We explain why the federal courts found it nec-
essary to scrutinize whether the laws adopted by the states to regulate
takeovers were preempted by the Williams Act and discuss the evolution
of state antitakeover laws and judicial scrutiny of those laws. The Essay
then highlights that the federal courts have thus far not conducted a sys-
tematic constitutional review of these state-law poison-pill rules-by far
the most important antitakeover rules in contemporary corporate law.
As explained below, federal courts considering challenges to state
antitakeover rules examine whether such rules are preempted by the
Williams Act. Preemption challenges arise in many contexts, and indeed
they may occur whenever a state adopts a law in an area where Congress
has also enacted legislation. In general, federal law will preempt state law
where the federal law at issue expressly preempts state law; where federal
law occupies an entire field, leaving no room for further state lawmaking;
or where state law stands as an obstacle to the achievement of the objec-
tives or purposes of a federal law.17 Federal courts face such challenges
Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187, 188 (1991). For an analysis of,
and response to, the argument that market pressures are detrimental to long-term value
creation, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term
Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637 (2013).
17. In general, "express" preemption applies where a federal statute includes a
clause explicitly withdrawing particular powers from the states; "field" preemption applies
where a federal law so completely occupies a particular field that the states may no longer
regulate in that area; and "conflict" preemption applies where federal law preempts state
law because the two "actually conflict[]." English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
According to the Supreme Court, "such a conflict exists if either (1) compliance with both
the state and federal law is 'a physical impossibility' or (2) state law 'stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 228 (2000) (quoting Boggs v. Boggs, 520
U.S. 833, 844 (1997)).
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frequently; in particular, preemption challenges based on the possibility
that state law stands as an obstacle to the achievement of the purposes
and objectives of federal law are now common at the Supreme Court.
18
The courts' analysis whether the Williams Act preempts state antitakeover
law has focused exclusively on whether the state law at issue is an obstacle
to the achievement of the purposes of federal law, and in particular on
the possibility that the state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Congress's objectives when enacting the Williams Act. Thus, throughout
this Essay, our discussion of the validity of state-law poison-pill rules
focuses on whether those rules are an obstacle to the objectives Congress
sought to achieve in the Williams Act.
In Part I.A, we describe the Williams Act and the concerns that moti-
vated Congress to enact it. Part I.B describes the federal courts' approach
to reviewing the relationship between the Williams Act and state anti-
takeover statutes. Part I.C explains that the courts' analysis to date has
not directly addressed the constitutionality of state-law poison-pill rules-
rules that play a key role in the modern corporate-governance landscape.
A. The Williams Act and the States
Until 1968, cash tender offers in the United States were unregulated.
Motivated by the specter of coercive tender offers,' 9 in that year Congress
passed the Williams Act, mandating federal regulation that would require
tender offerors to give investors sufficient time and information to
decide whether to tender their shares.
2 0
Because the Williams Act does not include an express preemption clause and cannot
be said to occupy its field, the federal courts' analysis of the relationship between the
Williams Act and state antitakeover law has focused exclusively on conflict preemption.
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 79 (1987) ("Because it is
entirely possible for entities to comply with both the Williams Act and [a particular state
antitakeover law], the[se] state statute[s] can be pre-empted only if [they] frustrate[] the
purposes of the federal law.").
18. In the recently completed October 2013 Term alone, the Supreme Court decided
six preemption cases, most of which examined whether state law frustrated the purposes
and objectives of, and thus was preempted by, federal law. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett,
133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013) (federal drug laws preempt state design-defect claims against
pharmaceutical companies); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247,
2257 (2013) (federal voting law preempts state-law requirement that voters provide
evidence of citizenship); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of L.A., 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2099 (2013)
(federal law preempts city's concession agreement related to parking); Hillman v. Maretta,
133 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2013) (federal law preempts certain state laws related to
beneficiaries of insurance plans); Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769,
1775 (2013) (federal law does not preempt state-law claims related to storage and disposal
of towed automobile); Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1398 (2013) (federal law preempts
state law governing reimbursement from beneficiary's tort damage proceeds).
19. While before 1968 coercive cash tender offers had been relatively uncommon,
they became "daily fare for the readers of the financial page" in the late 1960s. Note, Cash
Tender Offers, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 377 (1969).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2012).
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The Williams Act, and the rules that the Securities and Exchange
Commission has promulgated under the Act's authority, extensively reg-
ulate the terms of tender offers. They mandate, for example, that tender
offers remain open for at least twenty business days, and that tender of-
ferors open their offers to all shareholders and pay all who tender the
"best" price.
2'
The Williams Act went through extensive revisions prior to its
enactment as Congress debated how to establish the appropriate balance
among the players in a tender offer-outside investors, shareholders, and
management. 22 Senator Williams himself acknowledged that his initial
proposal might disfavor outside investors, and he withdrew the bill after
discussions with SEC staff highlighted that problem.23 The Senator then
introduced a second bill, noting that he had "taken extreme care with
this legislation to balance the scales equally to protect the legitimate
interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders," and that
"[e]very effort ha[d] been made to avoid tipping the balance ... in favor
of management or in favor of the offeror. ' '24 When a congressional hear-
ing revealed that even his second proposal raised concerns that the stat-
ute shifted this balance too far in favor of insiders,25 Senator Williams
introduced a third proposal, which eventually became the Williams Act.
2 6
The Senator explained that his revisions were designed to "provide the
offeror and management equal opportunity to present their case" to
shareholders in the event of a tender offer.
27
In the decades since the Williams Act became law, many states have
developed legal arrangements designed to supplement the rules estab-
lished by the Act. These supplemental state-law rules generally limited
the ability of outside investors to take control of public companies-and
therefore provided incumbents with additional protection from such
21. See id. § 78n(d) (4)-(7); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-10, 240.14e-1 (2014).
22. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 90-550, at 3 (1967) ("It was strongly urged during the
hearings [on the proposed Williams Act] that takeover bids should not be discouraged
because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient
management.").
23. 111 Cong. Rec. 28,258 (1965) (statement of Sen. Williams) (acknowledging
initial proposal would "obviously work to the disadvantage of any corporate takeover
specialists"). For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Williams Act, see
Andrew E. Nagel, Andrew N. Vollmer & Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
& Dorr LLP, The Williams Act: A Truly "Modern" Assessment 1-4 (2011), available at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/201 1/10/The-Williams-Act-A-Truly-Modern-
Assessment.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
24. 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
25. See Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover
Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong. 133-35 (1967) (statement of Stanley Kaplan, Professor, University of
Chicago Law School).
26. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78).
27. 113 Cong. Rec. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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investors. These developments raised the question whether, and to what
extent, such state-law rules disrupted the "careful balance" between out-
side investors and management that Congress struck in the Williams
Act-and, thus, were preempted by the Act. As the next section explains,
that question has been the focus of several decisions by the federal
courts, including the Supreme Court.
B. Federal Scrutiny of State Antitakeover Law
Following the passage of the Williams Act, the states have adopted a
wide range of rules that supplement the Act's regulation of takeovers.
Accordingly, over time the federal courts have developed a series of doc-
trinal tests to evaluate whether the Williams Act preempts these state-law
rules. As we explain below, however, the courts have not yet resolved the
validity of the most important state-law rules in the modern corporate-
governance landscape: those authorizing the use of the poison pill.
1. First-Generation Takeover Laws and Edgar v. MITE Corp. - Imme-
diately after Congress adopted the Williams Act, some thirty-seven states
enacted what are now known as "first-generation" takeover statutes.
28
These laws typically imposed additional burdens upon takeover bid-
ders-for example, by requiring that a proposed tender offer be submit-
ted to state officials for approval.
29
The Supreme Court first examined the possibility that the Williams
Act preempted such statutes in Edgar v. MITE Corp.50 In MITE the Court
considered a preemption challenge to the Illinois Business Take-Over
Act, which allowed the Illinois Secretary of State to hold a hearing about
any hostile tender offer, and authorized the Secretary to pass on the fair-
ness of the offer-and enjoin a substantively unfair offer.3 1 Justice White,
writing for a plurality, concluded that the Illinois law was preempted by
the Williams Act.
3 2
Noting that the proper preemption inquiry was whether the state law
"frustrate [d] the objectives of the Williams Act," Justice White concluded
28. See, e.g., Neil Fabricant, Hostile Tender Offers: Can the States Shut Them
Down?, 22 J. Corp. L. 27, 35-46 (1996) (comparing first-generation takeover statutes in
Delaware and New York).
29. For a description of the statutes adopted by the states that enacted first-
generation antitakeover statutes, see Michael W. Schwartz, Edward D. Herlihy & David A.
Katz, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Selected Developments in Takeover Tactics and
Defense, in 1 New Dimensions in Securities Litigation: Planning and Strategies 323, 376-
77 (Am. Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Continuing Prof'l Educ. ed., 1992)
(describing such statutes adopted in more than thirty-five states).
30. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). The Court's opinion in MITE expanded upon its analysis of
the purpose of the Williams Act in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22-24
(1977), in which the Court considered whether an implied cause of action arises under
the Williams Act's provisions addressing fraud in the tender-offer context.
31. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634-40 (discussing Illinois Business Take-Over Act).
32. Id. at 639-40.
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that the Illinois statute impermissibly interfered with Congress's objec-
tives in two ways. First, the provisions of the statute authorizing the
Secretary of State to call a hearing "frustrate[d] the congressional pur-
pose by introducing extended delay into the tender offer process";
according to Justice White, "In enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself
recognized that delay can seriously impede a tender offer and sought to
avoid it."
33
Second, Justice White noted that the Williams Act implemented
Congress's policy to protect investors "while maintaining the balance
between management and the bidder." To do so, Congress required the
bidder to "furnish the investor and the target company with adequate
information but there was no inten[tion] to do... more than give
incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its posi-
tion."'34 However, Justice White explained that " [o]nce that opportunity
was extended, Congress anticipated that the investor, if he so chose, and
the takeover bidder should be free to move forward within the time
frame provided by Congress."35 "[Tihe Williams Act and its legislative
history... indicate that Congress intended investors to be free to make
their own decisions," Justice White wrote, and the Illinois statute thus
took "an approach quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress."
3 6
2. Second-Generation Takeover Laws and CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of
America. - Following the Supreme Court's decision in MITE, several
states repealed their first-generation takeover laws, and within four years,
33. Id. at 637-38 (quoting Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277
(5th Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev'd on other grounds, Leroy v.
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)) (citing S. Rep. No. 90-550, at 4 (1967)).
34. Id. at 634 (quoting Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 639-40 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980),
affd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624). In the course of its critique of this
Essay, the Wachtell Response claims that, in MITE, Justice White "[mlisread[] ... the
Williams Act," and that the Justice's "stunning[]" analysis is "insupportable." Wachtell
Response, supra note 9. As explained below, this criticism of our discussion of Justice
White's analysis is wholly unwarranted.
Our analysis does not assume thatJustice White's approach-although expressed in a
plurality opinion of the Supreme Court-represents the current state of the law. We do
note, however, that in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)-the
Supreme Court's most recent opinion in this area-the Court applied Justice White's
framework to assess the Williams Act's preemptive scope. See infra text accompanying
notes 40-42. The Wachtell Response contends that the Court employed Justice White's
approach merely "for the sake of argument." Wachtell Response, supra note 9. Supreme
Court opinions, however, generally do not apply in their analysis, even for the sake of
argument, an approach that is "insupportable." Id. Furthermore, as explained below, the
Justices in CTS could have adopted the narrow view of the Williams Act urged in the
Wachtell Response. Indeed Justice Antonin Scalia described a similar view in a separate
opinion in CTS, see 481 U.S. at 94 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment), but no other Justice joined that opinion. See infra text accompanying notes
123-124.
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twenty-one states had adopted so-called "second-generation" takeover
statutes. These statutes typically deterred acquisitions by requiring a
shareholder vote to approve the purchase of shares by any investor cross-
ing specified ownership thresholds-and excluding shares owned by the
acquiror for purposes of this vote.
37
The Supreme Court considered whether the Williams Act pre-
empted such statutes in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America.38 The Court
concluded that an Indiana statute that limited acquirors' voting rights
unless disinterested shareholders approved the transaction at a meeting
to be held within fifty days of the offer was not preempted for two rea-
sons.3 9 First, the Court noted that, although the statute might impose
some delay on tender offerors, a fifty-day delay was not so unreasonable
as to warrant preemption. Unlike the statute in MITE,0 which held the
"potential for infinite delay," the Court held that the potential fifty-day
delay imposed by the Indiana law was reasonable.4 ' Second, the Court
noted that, unlike the statute in MITE, which empowered state officials
to decide whether a tender offer could go forward, the Indiana law
"allow[ed] shareholders to evaluate the fairness of the offer collectively," a
result that supplemented, rather than undermined, the investor protec-
tions Congress mandated in the Williams Act.
42
37. For an insightful discussion of the emergence of second-generation statutes, see
Stephen A. Bainbridge, Mergers and Acquisitions 329 (3d ed. 2012).
38. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
39. Id. at 86-87.
40. The CTS Court expressly chose not to overrule MITE, and noted only that Justice
White's opinion had not commanded a majority. Id. at 81-82 & n.6.
41. Id. at 85. The Court acknowledged more generally that, by regulating tender
offers at all, the Indiana statute "makes them more expensive and thus deters them
somewhat," but it held the law consistent with the Williams Act because "this type of
reasonable regulation does not alter the balance between management and offeror in any
significant way." Id. at 82 n.7. That was true in CTS because the "principal result of the
[Indiana law] is to grant shareholders the power to deliberate collectively about the merits
of tender offers. This result is fully in accord with the purposes of the Williams Act." Id.
42. Id. at 84 (emphasis in original). The Court also pointed out that, if the Williams
Act were construed to preempt "any state statute that may limit or delay the free exercise
of power after a successful tender offer," "the Williams Act would preempt a variety of
state corporate laws," including those permitting staggered election of directors. Id. at 85.
Lower courts interpreting CTS have suggested that one implication of this language is that
state antitakeover laws that block tender offerors from taking control of a company for a
lengthy period after acquiring a majority of its shares are not preempted because the CTS
Court seemed to approve state laws permitting staggered board elections, which similarly
block hostile acquirors from taking control of the board for long periods of time. See, e.g.,
RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Cont'l, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 486 (D. Del. 1988) (noting
that, because Supreme Court "advised" in CTS "that a two year delay [caused by a
staggered board] before an acquirer obtains 'untrammeled authority' endures Supremacy
Clause-Williams Act scrutiny," Delaware's business-combination statute, imposing three-
year delay before tender offeror can take control of the board, must also survive
constitutional review). It might be argued that CTS's implicit approval of staggered board
arrangements suggests that state-law poison-pill rules are also unlikely to be preempted. As
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3. Third-Generation Takeover Laws and Post-CTS Cases. - In the wake
of CTS, several states established new state-law arrangements further
regulating tender offers. One type of law, the "business-combination"
statute, prohibits a corporation from engaging in a business combination
within a set time period after a shareholder acquires a particular level of
share ownership.4" Some states have also adopted statutes expressly
authorizing directors to adopt antitakeover arrangements like the poison
pill and limiting state courts' ability to review such arrangements. 44 And
in Delaware--the State whose law governs more than half of the publicly
traded companies in the United States-the state law governing defen-
sive tactics like the poison pill has been developed through judicial
decisions.4"
The federal courts have considered whether third-generation take-
over laws are preempted by the Williams Act in several recent cases chal-
lenging business-combination statutes. These cases suggest that the
courts will take one of three approaches when evaluating whether the
Williams Act preempts state takeover rules. All of these courts agree that
where there is a direct conflict between the Williams Act and a state's
takeover law, the state law will be held invalid. The courts are divided,
however, with respect to whether there are meaningful constraints on
state takeover law beyond those that directly conflict with the Williams
Act.
The Supreme Court last spoke on Williams Act preemption in 1987,
when the Court decided CTS. Since then, at least ten federal courts,
including the Seventh Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and First Circuit, as well as
district judges in Delaware, Maryland, Wisconsin, and Georgia, have
we explain below, however, because state-law poison-pill rules can be used to block tender
offerors from acquiring shares of the company's stock-rather than blocking offerors who
have already acquired the company's stock from acquiring control-state laws authorizing
staggered board elections do not block acquisitions of stock disfavored by incumbent
directors, as poison-pill rules do. See infra note 104. Thus, this argument should not be
expected to persuade the courts that state-law poison-pill rules are not preempted. See
infra note 104.
43. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (2012) (prohibiting a corporation from
engaging in a business combination with any interested stockholder for three years
following such time the stockholder became an interested stockholder unless certain
conditions are met). Other states have adopted "constituency" statutes, which allow, or in
some cases require, boards of directors to consider the interests of constituencies other
than shareholders in determining how to respond to a hostile takeover offer. See, e.g.,
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(E) (West 1988) (allowing boards of directors to consider
nonshareholder interests).
44. See Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1973,
1995-97 (2009) (describing such statutes); see also, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-727.1
(2014) (limiting state-court review of poison pills).
45. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985) (considering
the validity of the poison pill); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955
(Del. 1985) (putting forward standards for reviewing board responses to takeover
proposals).
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examined the preemption of third-generation takeover laws. As explain-
ed below, these courts have produced widely divergent views on this sub-
ject. The decisions, however, can be usefully divided into three different
approaches to the preemptive scope of the Williams Act.
a. Preemption Due to Conflict with Congressional Purpose. - One group
of federal courts has held that the Williams Act preempts state laws that
interfere with Congress's purpose in promulgating the Act. Some have
emphasized that, to be consistent with that purpose, the statute must give
tender offerors a "meaningful opportunity for success. '46 Others have
contended that state laws that interfere with investors' freedom to
determine whether to accept a tender offer are preempted.47 All of the
46. See BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 469 (D. Del. 1988) ("[E]ven
statutes with substantial deterrent effects on tender offers do not circumvent Williams Act
goals, so long as hostile offers which are beneficial to target shareholders have a
meaningful opportunity for success."); see also West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley Inc.,
711 F. Supp. 1096, 1102 (N.D. Ga. 1989); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
1551, 1555 (D. Del. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp., 686 F. Supp. at 482-84. In a recent
symposium in the Business Lawyer assessing whether Delaware's business-combination
statute, tit. 8, § 203, is preempted by the Williams Act, the principal article and three of
the five commentaries each assumed that this approach continues to govern analysis of
Williams Act preemption claims. See Subramanian, Herscovici & Barbetta, Is Delaware's
Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional?, supra note 5, at 705; see also Greg A. Jarrell, A
Trip down Memory Lane: Reflections on Section 203 and Subramanian, Herscovici, and
Barbetta, 65 Bus. Law. 779, 780 (2010) (noting that, at the time the Delaware legislature
was considering section 203, lawmakers were attempting to "avoid [having the statutes be]
ruled unconstitutional," and the "trick was to make sure that the law somehow afforded a
hostile bidder some meaningful chance to succeed"); Eileen T. Nugent, A Timely Look at
DGCL Section 203, 65 Bus. Law. 753, 757 n.22 (2010) ("Indeed, the definition of
'meaningful opportunity for success' is itself key to any [constitutional] analysis."); A.
Gilchrist Sparks, III & Helen Bowers, After Twenty-Two Years, Section 203 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law Continues to Give Hostile Bidders a Meaningful Opportunity
for Success, 65 Bus. Law. 761, 762 (2010) (describing test as the "relevant legal standard");
cf. Guhan Subramanian, Steven Herscovici & Brian Barbetta, Is Delaware's Antitakeover
Statute Unconstitutional? Further Analysis and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 65 Bus.
Law. 799, 806 (2010) [hereinafter Subramanian, Herscovici & Barbetta, Further Analysis
and a Reply] (concluding that courts are likely to adopt "meaningful opportunity for
success" test in response to a Williams Act preemption challenge of section 203, but noting
that this choice is not "mandated by existing law"). But see Stephen P. Lamb &Jeffrey M.
Gorris, A Practical Response to a Hypothetical Analysis of Section 203's Constitutionality,
65 Bus. Law. 771, 772-74 (2010) (noting later cases have cast "doubt" on whether
"meaningful opportunity for success" test is appropriate analysis for Williams Act
preemption); Ribstein, supra note 7, at 792 (arguing "meaningful opportunity for success"
test does not provide clear guidance to practitioners or lawmakers about how to avoid
preemption of antitakeover statutes).
47. See, e.g., Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 853 (lst Cir. 1988)
(Coffin, J., for unanimous panel including then-Judge Breyer) (noting state laws that let
"management decide for investors instead of letting investors decide for themselves" are
likely to be preempted); RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., No. 88-C-378, 1988 WL 75453,
at *3 (E.D. Wis. May 6) (noting state laws that "vest[] existing management with the power
to block a tender offer ... frustrate[] the purpose of the Williams Act"), vacated as moot,
1988 WL 75453 (June 22, 1988).
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decisions in this group, however, conclude that state laws in tension with
Congress's broader purposes are preempted by the Williams Act.
This Essay discusses these decisions, and their implications for the
validity of state-law poison-pill rules, in Part II.A below. As explained
there, courts taking this approach can be expected to conclude that cur-
rent state-law poison-pill rules are preempted by the Williams Act.
b. Preemption Due to Adverse Effects on Investor Interests. - Another set
of decisions suggests that the Williams Act preempts only those state laws
that are in fact detrimental for shareholders-that is, laws that can be
shown to reduce shareholder value.48 Under this view, the Williams Act
sets a floor for the level of protection shareholders must receive in con-
nection with tender offers; states are free to provide protection to inves-
tors above that level. State laws that reduce investor value, however, are
preempted by the Act.
The Essay discusses this approach and its likely effect on the validity
of state-law poison-pill rules in Part II.B below. As explained there, courts
taking this approach will have to determine whether state laws that
empower directors to use the poison pill to delay tender offers for long
periods of time enhance shareholder value.
c. Preemption Only Due to Conflict with Statutorily Mandated Procedures.
Finally, some courts evaluating whether business-combination statutes
are preempted by the Williams Act have concluded that the Act preempts
only those laws that directly conflict with the procedures set forth in the
Act.49 So long as the participants in a tender offer can comply with the
requirements of both the Williams Act and state law, these courts have
held, the state laws are not preempted. Under this view, states may
authorize antitakeover devices that completely block outside offers if
states choose to do so.
We discuss these decisions and their likely implications for the valid-
ity of state-law poison-pill rules in Part II.C below. As we explain there,
courts taking this approach are likely to hold that the Williams Act does
not preempt these rules. But, as we also explain below, courts consider-
ing a preemption challenge to state-law poison-pill rules are unlikely to
adopt this approach.
48. See, e.g., Veere, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027, 1030
(N.D. Ohio 1988) ("[T]he purpose of the Williams Act [was not a] guarantee of a level
playing field for offeror and management in the take-over game... but as protection for
the investor while management and offeror are on the field.").
49. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 503 (7th
Cir. 1989) (noting that the Williams Act and other federal securities rules "frequently
regulate process while state corporate law regulates substance"); see also WLR Foods v.
Tyson Foods, 65 F.3d 1172, 1179 (4th Cir. 1995) ("While the Williams Act governs the
process of tender offers, it leaves to the states the power to regulate substantive matters of
corporate governance."); Realty Acquisition Corp. v. Prop. Trust of Am., No. JH-89-2503,
1989 WL 214477, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 1989) (citing Amanda Acquisition, 877 F.2d at 496).
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C. The Unresolved Validity of State-Law Poison-Pill Rules
Commentators generally agree that the rules governing the poison
pill are among the most important issues in contemporary corporate
lawY.5 And, as we explain in the next Part, these rules are clearly the most
important aspect of modern mergers and acquisitions. Despite these
rules' importance, however, the courts have not clearly resolved whether
the Williams Act preempts them. And, surprisingly, the unresolved con-
stitutional status of these rules has received little attention from
commentators.
Most importantly, although a significant number ofjudicial opinions
have considered the constitutionality of various types of state antitake-
over impediments, the federal courts have paid limited attention to the
possibility that the Williams Act preempts state-law poison-pill rules. To
begin, neither of the Supreme Court cases in this area, MITE and CTS,
expressly considered this possibility with respect to poison-pill rules.
Moreover, the subsequent federal-court decisions that expressed a
willingness to impose limits on the scope of state antitakeover law did not
expressly apply their analysis to state-law poison-pill rules.5" In one case, a
federal trial court briefly indicated in dictum that such rules "may be
preempted by the Williams Act."52 But aside from this exception, the
courts that have held that the Williams Act imposes meaningful limits on
the devices that states can authorize to interfere with tender offers have
not addressed whether the Act preempts state-law poison-pill rules.53
The federal courts that have taken the view that the Williams Act
imposes no substantive limits on the scope of state-law antitakeover
50. See, e.g., Allen, Kraakman & Subramanian, supra note 2, at 593 (stating that the
poison pill "dominates" state takeover statutes because the pill makes it practically
impossible to acquire a stake sufficient to trigger such statutes).
51. See, e.g., Hyde Park, 839 F.2d at 853 (holding state-law rules letting "management
decide for investors instead of letting investors decide for themselves" preempted, but not
expressly considering state-law poison-pill rules); RTE Corp., 1988 WL 75453, at *3
(holding that state laws "vesting existing management with the power to block a tender
offer" are preempted, but not explicitly discussing state-law poison-pill rules).
52. See Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Res., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595, 604-05
(S.D. Tex. 1988) ("In reviewing the authorities on the use of the exclusionary-rights pill, it
has occurred to the court that its only justification of buying time may be preempted by
the Williams Act.").
53. We also note that, in response to a request from the Securities and Exchange
Commission for comment on the development of poison pills, several commentators
stated that poison pills are in tension with the intent of the Williams Act. Concept Release
on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Exchange Act Release No. 34-23486, 36
SEC Docket 230, 236 (July 31, 1986) ("The Commission requests comment as to the
appropriateness of federal intervention into the area of poison pills . . . ."); Div. of Corp.
Fin., SEC, Summary of Comments Relating to Takeovers and Contests for Corporate
Control, Release No. 34-23486, File No. S7-18-86, at 61 (1987) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) ("Thirteen commentators raised the concern that poison pills undermine,
circumvent or violate either the intent of the Williams Act specifically or federal law in
general.").
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devices have also paid little attention to whether the Act preempts state-
law poison-pill rules. It is worth noting that some discussion of this sub-
ject appears in two of the federal-court opinions taking this view of the
Williams Act's preemptive scope. While these opinions focused on other
state-law antitakeover rules, they did observe that their approach would
lead to the conclusion that state-law poison-pill rules are not constitu-
tionally problematic. 54 As we explain below, we acknowledge that, should
the federal courts adopt this approach to the Williams Act's preemptive
reach, state-law poison-pill rules would be held per se valid.55 However, as
explained in detail in Part III.C below, the narrow approach to the
Williams Act's preemptive scope put forward in these cases is unlikely to
prevail in future cases or, ultimately, in the Supreme Court.
56
Importantly, there is a body of cases that takes a substantially more
expansive view of the preemptive reach of the Act. These cases have not
explicitly addressed the poison pill-except for the brief dictum
described above-but, as we explain below, their reasoning implies that
state-law poison-pills are in significant tension with the Williams Act.
Like the federal courts, scholars have paid limited attention to
whether the Williams Act preempts state-law poison-pill rules, despite
extensive literature on the constitutionality of state antitakeover law
more generally. Indeed, since 1982, when the Supreme Court first con-
sidered the constitutionality of such laws, academics and practitioners
have published more than one hundred articles analyzing the case law on
the constitutionality of state antitakeover statutes.57 This scholarship,
54. See WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1181 (upholding Virginia statute authorizing
corporations to issue rights pursuant to poison-pill arrangements); Amanda Acquisition, 877
F.2d at 504 (suggesting, without holding, that the "state law [that] enforces poison pills"
could not "be thought preempted by the Williams Act"). We also note that the Delaware
Supreme Court addressed the possibility that the Williams Act preempts state-law poison-
pill rules in the well-known case of Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985). In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that such rules are not
preempted. See id. at 1353. The views of state courts, however, are not binding on any
federal court with respect to questions of federal law.
55. See infra Part III.C.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 123-135 (noting that this view is difficult to
reconcile with the text of Williams Act, the Supreme Court's recent cases on the
Supremacy Clause, and the fact that the Court could have adopted, but declined to adopt,
such a view in CTS).
57. A search of Westlaw's database of law reviews, texts, and bar journals for articles
with the phrase "preemption" and "takeover" in the same sentence published since 1982
identified 191 such articles. Prominent examples of such articles include Jeffrey N.
Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws:
An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 511, 512-14 (1997); Roberta S. Karmel, Is
It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 55, 77-78 (1991); Arthur R.
Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover Statutes
After CTS Corp., 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 699, 703-77 (1988); Ribstein, supra note 7, at 792;
and E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein & Robert J. Shaughnessy, The Delaware
Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strategies and Comparisons, 43 Bus. Law. 865, 877-78 (1988).
Other prominent articles addressing this subject include William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
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however, has focused largely on antitakeover statutes, paying limited
attention to the validity of state-law poison-pill rules.
5
1
Following this literature, nearly every corporate-law casebook in-
cludes a substantial section describing constitutional litigation over state
antitakeover statutes-but indicates that such statutes are irrelevant in
light of the overwhelming influence of the poison pill on the state-law
landscape. One leading casebook, for example, describes the major cases
in this area before concluding that the pill, rather than state antitakeover
statutes, functionally dominates the takeover landscape. 59 To the con-
trary, this Essay shows that these cases have not been rendered unimpor-
tant by the poison pill. Instead, an understanding of these cases is
necessary to assess whether the state-law rules governing the pill itself are
vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
As we show in the next Part, the state-law rules that authorize the
poison pill have indeed transformed the tender-offer landscape. Then, in
Part III, we turn to a comprehensive investigation of the validity of these
state-law poison-pill rules.
II. THE TRANSFORMATIVE EFFECT OF THE POISON PILL
In this Part, we show that state-law rules authorizing unlimited use of
the poison pill have drastically transformed the landscape that Congress
contemplated when passing the Williams Act. Current state laws author-
ize boards to use poison pills to block outside tender offers from reach-
ing shareholders indefinitely-or, at least, for a very long period of time.
Indeed, as explained below, these laws impede outside tender offers to
an even greater extent than the laws invalidated by the Supreme Court in
MITE. Moreover, recent changes in state law-including the increased
McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev.
619, 657-58 (2006); David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender
Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 153, 219-21 (1986); and Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative
Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 909, 944-45 (1994).
Recent significant contributions to this literature include Subramanian, Herscovici &
Barbetta, Is Delaware's Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional?, supra note 5, and
responses to that article in a recent Business Lawyer symposium, see supra note 46 and
sources cited therein, as well as Guhan Subramanian, Delaware's Choice, 39 Del. J. Corp.
L. 1 (2014), which argues that Delaware's business-combination statute, unless amended,
risks invalidation on Supremacy Clause grounds.
58. Articles that discuss state-law poison-pill rules include Lyman Johnson & David
Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 Sec.
Reg. LJ. 339, 341 (1989), and Ribstein, supra note 7, at 794-95.
59. See Allen, Kraakman & Subramanian, supra note 2, at 594; see also Michael
Klausner, GIGO: A Functional Analysis of Corporate Governance Indices 9 (Apr. 21, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.stem.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/
assets/documents/con_047439.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("With few
exceptions, state antitakeover statutes were dominated by the poison pill and therefore
became irrelevant once the pill was adopted ... ").
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prominence of state statutes endorsing use of the poison pill and the
elimination of careful review of the use of the pill in the Delaware
courts-have increasingly brought state law into tension with the pur-
poses and objectives of the Williams Act.
In Part II.A below, we explain the legal and economic tender-offer
landscape that the drafters of the Williams Act faced when the statute was
enacted in 1968. In Part II.B, we explain how state law empowers direc-
tors to use the pill to block outside tender offers. Finally, Part II.C shows
how these state-law developments have altered the landscape that law-
makers considered when they first designed the Williams Act.
A. The Tender-Offer Landscape at the Time of the Williams Act
When Congress passed the Williams Act, cash tender offers were vir-
tually unregulated. At the time Senator Williams's proposal was adopted,
state law gave outside investors considerable freedom with respect to the
acquisition of public-company stock. In particular, outside investors were
virtually assured that, so long as they abided the Act's requirements with
respect to the terms and conditions of a tender offer, their offer would
eventually be considered by shareholders.
To be sure, Senator Williams sought to eliminate the abusive, coer-
cive tender offers that had become commonplace in the years before the
passage of the Act.60 That is why the statute extensively regulates the
terms of such offers. Provided, however, that outside investors followed
these rules, the drafters of the Williams Act expected, in light of the law
in place in 1968, that managers and outsiders would have an opportunity
to "fairly present their case" to investors, who could then decide whether
to tender their shares.6
The structure and provisions of the statute and related regulations
show that the Williams Act is designed to facilitate the choice that law-
makers presumed shareholders would have in the event of a tender offer.
These rules include elaborate provisions that require bidders to provide
extensive information to investors and the incumbent board to provide a
recommendation to shareholders as to whether to accept the tender
offer.62 The rules contemplate that, whether or not the board favors the
offer, shareholders will be free, informed by the bidder's disclosures and
60. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing tender-offer landscape
prior to enactment of Williams Act).
61. S. Rep. No. 90-550, at 1-6 (1967) (describing legislative debate preceding passage
of Williams Act); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982) ("Congress
intended for investors to be free to make their own decisions.").
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6(d) (1) (2014) (requiring disclosure of identity and
financing of hostile tender offerors); id. § 240.14e-2 (giving incumbent directors facing a
hostile tender offer ten days to provide a statement indicating whether they recommend
that shareholders accept or reject the offer).
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the board's recommendation, to decide whether to accept the offer. 63
Clearly, the drafters of the Williams Act did not contemplate the
possibility that shareholders could be prohibited from making that
decision in any cases in which incumbents prefer that result. As
explained in the next section, however, current state law empowers
incumbents to block tender offers from reaching shareholders for a sig-
nificant period of time.
B. State-Law Licenses to Use Poison Pills
As we have noted, the drafters of the Williams Act did not expect
that state law would give directors the power to block tender offers.
Nearly two decades after the Act was passed, however, corporate lawyers
introduced the poison pill-a security that incumbents can issue to make
the buying of shares beyond a specified threshold prohibitively costly and
thereby prevent a takeover opposed by the board.6 4 The laws of a major-
ity of the states now give directors the power to use this mechanism.6 5
When adopting a poison pill, companies issue securities to their
investors that give shareholders the right to purchase the company's
stock at a significant discount from prevailing market prices.66 This right
is triggered only if an investor crosses a specified ownership threshold-
for example, twenty percent-of the company's stock. Critically, however,
any rights held by the investor who crosses the threshold are immediately
voided, so that all shareholders other than the offending investor retain the
right to acquire the company's stock at a discount. The economic effect
of triggering the poison pill for the investor crossing the ownership
threshold is disastrous, resulting in an immediate decrease in the value
and proportion of her stake in the company. For this reason, the poison
pill-and state laws authorizing its use-is by far the most effective way
for incumbent directors to block tender offers they disfavor.67
63. Indeed, the SEC rules that require the incumbent board to make a
recommendation to shareholders with respect to tender offers, see id. § 240.14e-2, assume
that incumbents will be permitted only to recommend whether shareholders should accept a
tender offer-not decide whether shareholders will be prohibited from even considering
such an offer, as current state law empowers incumbents to do.
64. See Allen, Kraakman & Subramanian, supra note 2, at 521-24 (recounting the
history of the invention of the poison pill). The poison pill, also known as a "rights plan,"
permits directors to issue rights that allow shareholders to purchase the company's stock at
a discounted price if someone acquires more than a certain percentage of that stock.
65. In a 2009 review of all fifty states' takeover laws, Michal Barzuza demonstrated
that a majority of states have adopted statutes expressly authorizing the use of the poison
pill. Barzuza, supra note 44, at 1988.
66. For a detailed description of the poison pill's structure and operation from the
pill's inventors, see 1 Martin Lipton & Erica H. Steinberger, Takeovers & Freezeouts
§ 5.01, at 5-2 to 5-4 (2014).
67. See id. § 6.03[4], at 6-56 to 6-58 (describing poison pills as the "most effective
device yet developed in response to abusive takeover tactics and inadequate bids").
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Indeed, many states' corporation statutes have been amended to
expressly authorize directors to use the poison pill. Furthermore, these
statutes often mandate that the directors' choice to use the pill may be
reviewed by the courts only through the lenient business-judgment
standard that any choice by directors must satisfy. In our view, because
the poison-pill rules established by the statutes of these states are espe-
cially straightforward and clear, parties considering a challenge on the
basis of Williams Act preemption should focus first on these jurisdictions.
In Delaware, the State whose law governs more than half of all pub-
licly traded companies in the United States, the use of the poison pill is
instead governed by case law. Initially, after the well-known case of Moran
v. Household International was decided in 1985,68 several commentators
expressed the hope that the Delaware courts would develop substantial
limits on the power of incumbents to use a pill to block a tender offer
they disfavored.69 However, over time, Delaware's judges instead adopted
a deferential approach to incumbents' use of poison pills, and have fol-
lowed such an approach since the early 1990s. Indeed, during the last
twenty years, despite the near-universal use of the poison pill, there has
not been a single case in which Delaware law was held to require direc-
tors to redeem a poison pill.
For instance, in an early example of the ability of Delaware corpora-
tions to use poison pills to block unsolicited offers for lengthy periods,
Circon blocked an offer from U.S. Surgical for nearly two years. 0 In a
more recent example, Airgas blocked an offer from Air Products for
more than a year.71 In that case, when the retention of the poison pill was
litigated in the Delaware Court of Chancery, Chancellor Chandler con-
cluded that the preceding delay had already given Airgas directors ample
time to educate the company's shareholders on the merits of the hostile
offer and that, in his "personal view, Airgas's poison pill ha[d] served its
legitimate purpose." 72 Yet Chancellor Chandler held that, notwithstand-
ing his view that the poison pill had served its legitimate purpose,
Delaware state law compelled him to allow the Airgas directors to keep
68. 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985).
69. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus.
Law. 247, 274 (1989) (expressing hope that Delaware law in this area might "live[] up to
its promise" of providing searching review of incumbents' decisions to use takeover
defenses to block disfavored tender offers).
70. See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note
15, at 913-14 (describing Circon's use of poison pill to block hostile offer by U.S.
Surgical).
71. The circumstances of this fight are described in detail in Chancellor Chandler's
opinion in Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 54 (Del. Ch. 2011).
72. Id. at 57.
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the pill in place and thus to deny shareholders an opportunity to decide
whether to accept the offer.
73
This pattern is consistent with the law in all states with rules author-
izing the use of poison pills. Over the past two decades, despite the many
cases in which incumbents have used the pill to block tender offers for
an extended period of time, we are unaware of a single instance in which
state-law poison-pill rules have been held to require directors to redeem
a poison pill and allow an offer to be considered by shareholders.
In this Essay, we focus on the power that state-law poison-pill rules
give incumbents to delay tender offers for significant periods of time.
Providing insiders with the authority to delay unsolicited offers for
lengthy periods is a principal source of the pill's current force as an anti-
takeover device. As explained below, state law purporting to give incum-
bents that power is in considerable tension with the Williams Act.
We would like to stress, however, that current state-law poison-pill
rules may have other dimensions that run afoul of the Williams Act. For
example, some state laws now authorize poison pills that cannot be
redeemed even if the incumbents who adopted the pill are unseated in a
proxy fight74 and pills that may be used to block an outside shareholder
from acquiring a significant block of stock.7 5 The preemption analysis
described in Part III below would apply to, and might well lead to invali-
dation of, such rules. For instance, as we plan to discuss in future work,
state-law poison-pill rules that authorize pills that are triggered upon the
73. See id. at 57-58 ("In my personal view, Airgas's poison pill has served its
legitimate purpose .... That being said, however, as I understand binding Delaware
precedent, I may not substitute my business judgment for that of the Airgas board.").
74. These poison pills, known as "dead-hand" pills, have been disapproved by the
Delaware courts, see, e.g., Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1189-92 (Del. Ch. 1998),
but state law gives directors the power to use these pills in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Georgia, see Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note
15, at 905 n.61, 906 (citing Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass'ns § 2-201(c) (2) (ii) (LexisNexis
2000); AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc., Nos. CIV. A. 98-4405, CIV. A. 98-4058, CIV. A. 98-
4109, 1998 WL 778348, at *5-*9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998); Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne
Tech., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997)).
75. As we have explained in recent work, companies are increasingly adopting poison
pills with low acquisition triggers-an ownership threshold of fifteen percent or less-in
order to use the pill to block not only disfavored tender offers but also activist investors
who seek to acquire significant blocks of company stock. Lucian A. Bebchuk & RobertJ.
Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 39,
56 & n.58 (2012) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Jackson, Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure] (noting, among 805 companies in Sharkrepellent dataset that had poison pills
in place as of 2012, seventy-six percent had pills triggered by ownership threshold of
fifteen percent or less, with fifteen percent having pills triggered by threshold of ten
percent or less). The Delaware courts have recently suggested that Delaware law authorizes
incumbents to use these pills to block activist investors from obtaining significant stakes.
See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, Nos. 9469-VCP, 9497-VCP, 9508-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029,
at *18-*'19 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
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acquisition of small amounts of the company's stock may well be
preempted by the Williams Act.
76
In this Essay, however, we focus on the validity of state-law poison-pill
rules that purport to give incumbents the power to block unsolicited
offers for significant periods of time. As explained in the next section,
that dimension of state-law poison-pill rules, standing alone, has trans-
formed the tender-offer landscape that Congress faced when it adopted
the Williams Act.
C. The Effect of the Poison Pill on the Tender-Offer Landscape
We now turn to the effects of these state-law rules on the modem law
of tender offers. The emergence of the poison pill significantly altered
the legal landscape that the drafters of the Williams Act expected to gov-
ern tender offers in 1968. The lawmakers who drafted the Act expected
that, so long as outside bidders complied with the rules set forth in the
Act, hostile offerors would be free to present their offer to shareholders.
But because pills make it prohibitively expensive for outsiders to proceed
with a tender offer without management's assent, so long as a pill is in
place a hostile bidder simply cannot proceed. Under current state law,
the pill effectively gives management the power to stop a hostile bidder
from presenting a tender offer to shareholders.
Moreover, today state-law poison-pill rules present more powerful
impediments to outside offers than those imposed by the state laws that
have been the subject of Williams Act preemption challenges in the
Supreme Court. The Illinois statute struck down in MITE, for example,
enabled incumbents to block disfavored tender offers from reaching
shareholders for six months.77 The Supreme Court held that, because
"the Williams Act and its legislative history ... indicate that Congress
intended for investors to be free to make their own decisions," state laws
giving incumbents the power to delay tender offers for a period far
longer than the timeframe specified in the Williams Act were preempted
by the Act.7" By contrast, today state law gives incumbents the power to
block tender offers by empowering directors to adopt and keep pills in
place for extended periods of time.
It is also worth noting that state-law poison-pill rules present a far
greater impediment to hostile tender offers than that imposed by the
Indiana statute upheld in CTS. By requiring hostile offers to be approved
by shareholders, the Indiana statute enabled incumbents to delay tender
76. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Preemption and Low-Trigger
Poison Pills (Aug. 22, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
77. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 637 (1982) (opinion of White, J.) (citing
Illinois Business Take-Over Act, which permitted incumbents to request state
administrative hearing on fairness of tender offers opposed by incumbents).
78. Id. at 639 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 90-1711, at 4 (1968)).
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offers for up to fifty days. The statute was substantively equivalent, then,
to a poison pill that shareholders could remove through a shareholder
vote after a fifty-day period. In approving the statute, the Supreme Court
was careful to note the limited delay that the statute imposed, remarking
that the Court could "[]not say that a [fifty-day] delay... [was] unrea-
sonable." 79 By contrast, state law now empowers directors to use the poi-
son pill to delay hostile offers for periods of time that are an order of
magnitude longer than fifty days-indeed, even longer than the six-
month delay imposed by the Illinois statute struck down in MITE.
It might be argued that, despite current state-law poison-pill rules,
hostile tender offerors can proceed by first replacing a majority of
incumbent directors with new directors committed to redeeming the pill.
However, most state antitakeover laws, like the poison pill, impose
impediments only on offers not approved by incumbents.80 Moreover, as
a practical matter, at most public companies today, replacing incumbent
directors would take a substantial amount of time." That period would
almost certainly exceed the fifty-day delay imposed by the statute
approved in CTS-and would also likely be longer than the six-month
delay imposed by the law struck down in MITE.
It might also be argued that, despite the existence of state-law
poison-pill rules, incumbents often ultimately agree to unsolicited
offers-including ones that they initially disfavor. Pressure from the mar-
ketplace as well as from investors, the argument goes, often leads incum-
bents to agree to allow such offers to reach shareholders.8 2 Under this
view, state-law poison-pill rules are not so draconian as to fully block
unsolicited tender offers. But this observation is in no way inconsistent
with the central proposition we have advanced in this Essay: that state-law
poison-pill rules impede unsolicited tender offers, and tip the balance
79. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 85 (1987).
80. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203(a) (3) (2012) (permitting a business
combination with an interested stockholder if the proposed combination is approved by
the company's board of directors).
81. In the absence of a charter provision permitting the removal of directors without
cause, a hostile bidder would be required to wait until the corporation's next annual
meeting before the incumbents could be unseated-a wait that can be as long as a full
year. See id. § 141 (k) (allowing removal of directors only with cause if board is classified).
Some thirty-one percent of S&P 500 companies currently permit removal of directors only
for cause. Takeover Defenses, Sharkrepellent.net, http://sharkrepellent.net (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (showing search results for firms that only permit removal
without cause in S&P 500 index). Moreover, at corporations with bylaw provisions
requiring advance notice of director nominations, a bidder must nominate alternative
directors several months before the annual meeting-and, once that deadline has passed,
the bidder must wait until the year after the next annual meeting to unseat the
incumbents. Approximately seventy percent of S&P 500 companies require at least ninety
days' notice of nominees to the board. Id. (showing search results in S&P 500 index for
firms with bylaws requiring ninety days' or more notice for nominations).
82. See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the
Takeover Debate, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 453, 477 (2005) (describing this dynamic).
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against bidders, to a greater degree than the antitakeover statutes held
preempted by the federal courts.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical state where tender offers are
governed by the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE. The six-month delay
imposed by the statute would not prevent markets and investors from
imposing pressure on directors to allow a hostile offer to go forward
ultimately, and corporate elections might well still enable many unsolic-
ited offers to ultimately succeed if they are favored by shareholders. Yet
the six-month delay imposed by the Illinois law was nevertheless consid-
ered sufficiently substantial as to lead to its invalidation by the Supreme
Court. Thus, the possibility that markets and investors might pressure
corporate directors not to use the power that state-law poison-pill rules
give them does not foreclose a successful preemption challenge against
those rules.
D. State-Law Poison-Pill Rules Versus Traditional Antitakeover Statutes
Even though state-law rules on the poison pill provide a much more
powerful impediment to tender offers than the statutes examined in CTS
and MITE, it might be argued that preemption analysis does not apply to
state-law poison-pill rules because, unlike state statutes, those rules ad-
dress private agreements between companies and investors. As we
explain in this section, however, this distinction is unlikely to convince
courts that state-law poison-pill rules are immune from preemption chal-
lenges under the Williams Act.
To be sure, traditionally Williams Act preemption challenges have
involved state statutes that expressly give boards of directors the power to
reject disfavored tender offers. By contrast, it might be argued, the poi-
son pill reflects an agreement among private actors that, like most such
arrangements, is enforced through state-law rules that sanction the agree-
ment." Thus, the argument would go, the poison pill is not an appropri-
ate subject for a preemption challenge.84
83. A related argument is that the poison pill is enforced by virtue of the common-
law decisions of state courts rather than state statutes and thus is not subject to
preemption analysis. The Supreme Court, however, has expressly rejected a similar
argument in its preemption cases. See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673-74 (1969)
(holding that the state common law of contracts, including principles of estoppel, cannot
be applied in a manner that presents an obstacle to accomplishment of the objectives of
federal patent law). Moreover, as explained below, for our purposes what is important is
that state law now plays a critical role in allowing incumbents to block tender offers for
lengthy periods of time. That fact alone is enough to raise serious questions as to whether
the Williams Act preempts state-law poison-pill rules. See infra text accompanying notes
84-90; cf. Johnson & Millon, supra note 58, at 341 ("[T]here is no reason in law or policy
that compels constitutional review of takeover statutes while sparing the more pervasive
principles of the common law from that same scrutiny.").
84. The Delaware Supreme Court took a similar view in concluding that state-law
poison-pill rules were not preempted by the Williams Act in Moran v. Household
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This distinction, however, makes little difference with respect to the
analysis that the courts apply to preemption claims. In both cases, state-
law rules play a critical role in allowing incumbents to block tender offers
for long periods of time. The role of state law in giving incumbents this
power is obvious when the law at issue is a state statute. But state law plays
an equally critical role in empowering incumbents to block tender offers
in the case of the poison pill.
For one thing, in the absence of state law sanctioning and providing
for the enforcement of the pill, the pill could not give incumbents effec-
tive power to block tender offers they disfavor. Indeed, in some states the
legislature affirmatively adopted statutes endorsing the poison pill before
companies adopted these arrangements.8 5 But whether private actors or
the state moved first to adopt poison pills is not important for purposes
of this Essay. What is important is that state law is what enables incum-
bents to use the poison pill to block tender offers for long periods of
time. To see this, note that, in jurisdictions around the world where
corporate-law rules do not authorize the pill to be used in this way,
incumbents cannot simply use private-law arrangements to block indefi-
nitely offers they disfavor.8 6 This illustrates that the pill is not merely a
private-law innovation; instead, state-law rules are critical to the extent to
which the pill empowers incumbents to block tender offers.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that the pill remains a private con-
tract between the company and its shareholders, and preemption analysis
typically does not apply to such arrangements. But this argument is also
unlikely to persuade courts that the Williams Act does not preempt state-
law poison-pill rules. To see why, consider an analogous example with
respect to the preemptive scope of section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which requires executives to repay to the firm any
"short-swing" profits that arise from their trading in the company's
stock.87 Suppose that state law permitted companies to adopt private con-
tracts with their executives that guaranteed insiders that any short-swing
profits they paid to the company would be immediately reimbursed by
the firm. Such arrangements would, of course, render section 16(b)
practically meaningless. We do not believe, of course, that existing state
laws permit these arrangements. But if they did, there is little doubt that
such state laws would be preempted. And the fact that state law produced
International, 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985) (holding preemption analysis is "not...
applicable to the actions of private parties").
85. See, e.g., Barzuza, supra note 44, at 1994 (describing states in which pill-
endorsement statutes preceded widespread adoption of the pill).
86. See, e.g., Paul L. Davies, Sarah Worthington & Eva Micheler, Cower & Davies'
Principles of Modern Company Law 963 (8th ed. 2008) ("[T]he two central tenets of the
British regulation of takeovers are that the shareholders alone decide on the fate of the
offer and equality of treatment of shareholders.").
87. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 881, 896
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (2012)).
1576 [Vol. 114:1549
2014] THE POISON PILL AND THE CONSTITUTION
this result merely by sanctioning a private-law arrangement would in no
way preclude a successful preemption challenge.
We are aware, of course, that section 16(b) has been the subject of
considerable scholarly criticism.8 Perhaps Congress should revise the
statute-or even repeal it.89 But the Constitution does not permit the
states to take matters into their own hands and undermine the effects of
a federal law-even an objectionable law-if Congress fails to address its
error.
Similarly, federal law prohibits corporate insiders from trading on
inside information, denying executives potential profits from such
trades.90 Suppose that, as a "private-law innovation," boards of directors
agreed that executives could inform the company of hypothetical trades
they would have made in the absence of a prohibition on insider trading,
and at the close of each year, the company would pay the executives an
amount equal to their hypothetical trading profits.9' Of course, state-law
rules do not currently permit boards of directors to contract with execu-
tives in this way. But suppose that state law was changed to authorize
boards and executives to enter into arrangements, like this one, that
thwart the federal prohibition on insider trading. There is little doubt
that such state-law rules would be preempted by federal law.
It might also be argued that preemption analysis should not apply to
state-law poison-pill rules because directors' actions pursuant to those
rules are constrained by the fiduciary duties that directors owe to share-
holders. For two reasons, however, the fact that directors' use of the pill
is limited by their fiduciary duties does not preclude preemption of state-
law poison-pill rules. First, the board's use of the traditional state statutes
that have been the subject of preemption challenges is also limited by the
directors' fiduciary duties. Since most of these statutes do not apply if
directors approve the tender offer, the statutes are typically triggered
only when the board decides not to approve the offer.92 Yet courts
considering preemption challenges to these statutes have not said that
the fact that the board's decision is subject to the directors' fiduciary
88. For a collection of the scholarly and practitioner criticism of section 16(b), see
Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held
Companies, 42 Hastings LJ.391, 393-99 (1991).
89. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider
Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 Fordham L. Rev. 309, 312 (1989) (advocating
repeal of section 16(b) to "promote the efficient regulation of insider trading").
90. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (2014).
91. An innovation like this one might be motivated by the view that, under some
circumstances, permitting insider trading might well be optimal from shareholders' point
of view. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 9-10 (1966).
92. For example, in Delaware, the board can choose to waive the protections of that
State's business-combination statute by approving the proposed transaction. See Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 203(a) (3) (2012).
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obligations precludes a finding of preemption.9" Instead, these courts
proceed to determine whether other features of the challenged state
law-for example, the extent of the delay that the law imposes on tender
offers-are consistent with the purpose of the Williams Act.
Second, recall the examples we provided above to explain why cor-
porations cannot enter into private arrangements that would evade the
purposes of section 16(b) of the Exchange Act or the federal law prohib-
iting insider trading. As we have explained, the board might very well
conclude, in good faith, that because those federal rules have deleterious
consequences for shareholders, the directors' fiduciary duties require
that the board adopt such arrangements. Nevertheless, the fact that the
directors' fiduciary duties compel that action does not suggest that state
law permits directors to take steps that would undermine the purposes of
federal law. To the contrary, it is clear that such arrangements, and the
state law that sanctioned them, would be preempted.
Given that the state-law rules on the poison pill have transformed
the tender-offer landscape imagined by the drafters of the Williams Act,
have provided incumbents with stronger antitakeover protections than
those imposed by the statutes considered by the Supreme Court in MITE
and CTS, and are not meaningfully different from the laws considered in
those cases, an examination of the constitutional validity of these rules is
necessary. Courts, commentators, and practitioners should not take for
granted that state-law poison-pill rules would survive a preemption chal-
lenge. Instead, these rules should be analyzed in light of the standards
the courts have provided for assessing claims that the Williams Act
preempts state law. We provide such an analysis in the next Part.
III. ARE STATE-LAW POISON-PILL RULES VALID?
Although the courts have not yet addressed the constitutionality of
state-law rules on the poison pill, previous cases provide three competing
approaches that the courts have used to determine the preemptive scope
of the Williams Act. This Part describes those approaches and assesses
how courts applying each would likely rule on claims that the Williams
Act preempts state-law rules governing the pill. All courts agree that
there are circumstances under which state takeover laws are preempted
because they conflict with the Williams Act. The courts have diverged,
however, with respect to the scope of the conflict that is necessary to con-
vince the court that the state law must fall.
94
93. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 794-95 (arguing that the fact that the use of poison
pill is "constrained by[] the board's fiduciary duty to the corporation" provides only a
"shaky" distinction between the pill and other state-law antitakeover devices that have
been subject to preemption analysis).
94. The standard that courts will use to assess preemption challenges to state-law
poison-pill rules will depend in part on whether such challenges are framed as facial or as-
applied. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (concluding facial
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In Part III.A below, we consider two approaches found in the cases
that would likely lead courts to conclude that current state-law rules on
the poison pill are preempted by the Williams Act. Part III.B explores an
approach under which it is unclear whether state-law rules on the pill
would survive preemption. Finally, Part III.C describes an approach that
would lead the courts to conclude that state-law rules governing the pill
are, as a matter of law, not preempted.
A. Per Se Preempted
Courts assessing preemption claims under the Williams Act have
taken two different approaches that would likely lead to the conclusion
that current state-law rules on the poison pill are per se invalid. In this
section, we discuss each of those frameworks-which emerged in parallel
in the years following the Supreme Court's decision in CTS-in turn.
The first, known as the "meaningful opportunity for success" test, is
derived from a series of federal-court decisions evaluating the consti-
tutionality of state business-combination laws, including City Capital
Associates v. Interco, Inc.95 The second, the "shareholder autonomy" view,
is reflected in several lower-court interpretations of the Supreme Court's
analysis in MITE and CTS, including the First Circuit's opinion for a
panel including then-Judge Breyer in Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly.
96
1. Meaningful Opportunity for Success. - Four federal courts that have
considered whether the Williams Act preempts state business-
combination statutes have concluded that the "power of the states to
regulate tender offers does not extend to complete eradication of hostile
offers."97 Nevertheless, because the "states have a legitimate interest in
regulating tender offers," these courts have held, the "question [is] to
constitutional challenge "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the [challenged] Act would be valid"); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) ("[A] facial challenge must fail where the
statute has a 'plainly legitimate sweep."' (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
739-40 & n.7 (1997) (StevensJ., concurring in the judgment))). For present purposes, we
put to one side the differences in the courts' approaches to facial and as-applied
challenges. To the extent, however, that courts assess whether state-law poison-pill rules
that permit incumbents to delay tender offers indefinitely can ever be applied consistently
with the purposes of the Williams Act, such challenges would properly be considered facial
challenges.
95. 696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del. 1988); see also West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley,
Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1096, 1102 (N.D. Ga. 1989) ("[S]tate statutes.., do not circumvent
Williams Act goals, so long as hostile offers which are beneficial to target shareholders
enjoy a meaningful opportunity for success" (internal quotation marks omitted)); RP
Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Cont'l, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 482 (D. Del. 1988); BNS Inc. v.
Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 469 (D. Del. 1988). For a brief discussion of these cases,
see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
96. 839 F.2d 837, 852 (1st Cir. 1988).
97. BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 468.
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what extent a state may limit them" consistent with the Williams Act.98 To
ascertain the scope of Williams Act preemption, then, these courts ask,
among other things, whether the state law "impose[s] an indefinite or
unreasonable delay on offers."
99
Under this approach, even a state law, such as Delaware's business-
combination statute, that "alters the balance between target manage-
ment and the offeror, perhaps significantly,"' 00 is constitutional "so long
as hostile offers.., enjoy a 'meaningful opportunity for success."
' 0 1
Because state business-combination statutes typically contain exceptions
that permit hostile offerors to obtain control in some circumstances,
these courts have held those statutes not preempted' 2 under the "mean-
ingful opportunity for success" approach.
0 3
However, courts applying this test can be expected to hold state-law
rules governing the poison pill preempted by the Williams Act. As
explained in Part I, these rules give hostile offerors no practical oppor-
tunity for success, because they allow incumbents to block a hostile offer
from shareholder consideration for long periods of time. In nearly all
98. Id. at 468-69.
99. Id. at 469.
100. Id. at 470.
101. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley, 711 F. Supp. 1096, 1102 (ND. Ga. 1989)
(quoting BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 469).
102. See, e.g., BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 470-72 (concluding that Delaware's business-
combination statute, which includes exceptions that allow hostile offerors to obtain
control in limited circumstances, was not preempted under the "meaningful opportunity
for success" test). All four courts that have adopted this test have left open the possibility
that future evidence might show that the requirements of these statutory exceptions are
met so rarely that a hostile offeror's opportunity for success is not "meaningful," and thus
that the Williams Act preempts the state law. See, e.g., id. at 471-72 (noting that, if
subsequent evidence demonstrates that a state law denies offerors a meaningful
opportunity to succeed, the state law would be preempted by the Williams Act). As we have
noted, in a 2010 article Guhan Subramanian, Steven Herscovici, and Brian Barbetta
accepted the courts' invitation to evaluate this question empirically with respect to
Delaware's business-combination statute. See Subramanian, Herscovici & Barbetta, Is
Delaware's Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional?, supra note 5, at 686-87. The authors
found that, over a period of nineteen years, no bidder had endured the statute's three-
year waiting period and succeeded in acquiring its target, and they argued that this finding
cast the constitutionality of the Delaware statute into doubt under the "meaningful
opportunity for success" test. See id. at 687. To our knowledge, however, the courts have
not yet systematically revisited the claim that Delaware's business-combination statute is
preempted by the Williams Act. Regardless of how the debate over this claim is resolved,
however, there can be little doubt that state-law rules on the poison pill leave no practical
opportunity for success for a hostile tender offeror.
103. In their response to this Essay, several senior partners of Wachtell Lipton
contend that the decisions of these courts are "now discredited." Wachtell Response,
supra note 9. We note, however, that these decisions have never been overruled by an
authoritative court, and the assertion that they have been "discredited" is thus
unwarranted. These decisions, and the "meaningful opportunity for success" test for
determining the scope of the Williams Act's preemptive reach, remain the law of the
jurisdictions where these cases were decided.
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states-like in Delaware, as the recent Airgas decision demonstrates-
state law permits directors to use the pill to delay a tender offer for a
sufficiently lengthy period that hostile bidders have no practical
opportunity to acquire control.
10 4
It might be argued that state-law poison-pill rules provide hostile
tender offerors with some possibility of success because those rules
authorize use of the pill only where directors can show that their deci-
sions were the product of valid business judgment. This argument,
though, will likely not persuade courts using this approach that state-law
poison-pill rules currently give hostile tender offerors a meaningful
opportunity for success. It is commonly understood that the business-
judgment standard requires only that directors observe basic procedural
obligations in connection with corporate decisions, and in fact the rule
expressly prohibits courts from engaging in substantive review of direc-
tors' decisions. 10 5 Thus, courts are unlikely to conclude that state law
authorizing directors to permanently block tender offers on the basis of
such a limited showing gives offerors the meaningful opportunity for
success necessary to avoid Williams Act preemption.
2. Shareholder Autonomy. - Other lower federal courts have held
that, because Congress's purpose in passing the Williams Act was to pro-
tect investors' freedom to decide whether to accept a tender offer, the
Williams Act preempts state laws that compromise shareholders' auton-
omy in that context. These courts emphasize language in the Supreme
Court's decisions in MITE and CTS that focuses on the potential effects
of state law on shareholders' freedom to receive, and to decide whether
to accept, a tender offer.
10 6
104. See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 129 (Del. Ch.
2011) (describing current state of the law of poison pills in Delaware). As we have noted,
some courts adopting the meaningful opportunity for success test have pointed out that
the CTS Court suggested that state-law rules that block majority shareholders from
obtaining control, such as those permitting staggered board elections, are not preempted
by the Act. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 85-86 & n.11 (1987); see
also supra note 42 (citing RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Cont'l, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 486
(D. Del. 1988)). Importantly, however, these courts were evaluating the constitutionality of
Delaware's business-combination statute, which, like state-law rules permitting staggered
boards, blocks large shareholders from obtaining corporate control. By contrast, state-law
poison-pill rules allow incumbents to block tender offerors from presenting their offers to
purchase the company's stock to its shareholders--offers that are extensively regulated by
the Williams Act. Thus, the possibility that the CTS Court endorsed state-law rules
permitting the staggered election of directors does not suggest that state-law poison-pill
rules are not preempted by the Williams Act.
105. See, e.g., Allen, Kraakman & Subramanian, supra note 2, at 250 ("[Tlhe
business judgment rule means that courts will not decide ... whether the decisions of
corporate boards are either substantively reasonable ... or sufficiently well
informed ... ").
106. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 84 (1987) (concluding that a state law was not preempted
by Williams Act because it "allows shareholders to evaluate the fairness of the offer
collectively" (emphasis in original)); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982)
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For example, a First Circuit panel concluded in Hyde Park Partners v.
Connolly that a Massachusetts antitakeover statute was likely preempted
because the law interfered with investors' freedom to determine whether
to accept a tender offer.1"7 One of the members of the panel that issued
this opinion was then-Judge Stephen G. Breyer, now a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States. The First Circuit took the view that
the law "only serve[d] to decrease [shareholders'] ability to take
advantage of tender offers" and thus could not be reconciled with
Congress's purpose in adopting the Williams Act; a state law that "lets
management decide for investors instead of letting investors decide for
themselves,"""5 the court concluded, was preempted.'0 9
Accordingly, courts applying the shareholder-autonomy framework
can be expected to hold state-law rules governing the poison pill
preempted by the Williams Act. As we have explained, state-law rules
today empower directors to adopt arrangements that permit incumbents,
rather than investors, to decide whether shareholders may accept a ten-
der offer.110 We acknowledge, of course, that supporters of these state-law
rules contend that denying shareholders this choice ultimately benefits
investors. Many, including one of us, have disputed that claim."' For pur-
(holding state takeover statute preempted because the drafters of the Williams Act
envisioned that "the investor, if he so chose, and the takeover bidder should be free to
move forward [with the tender offer] within the time frame provided by Congress").
107. 839 F.2d 837, 852 (1st Cir. 1988).
108. Id. at 853; see also RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., No. 88-C-378, 1988 WL
75453, at *3 (E.D. Wis. May 6) (holding Wisconsin law preempted by Williams Act because
the CTS Court held the "primary purpose of the Williams Act [was] the promoting of
investor choice," and the "Wisconsin act... gives to the management of target companies
a virtual veto power over the outcome of a tender offer contest" (citing CTS, 481 U.S. at
84)), vacated as moot, 1988 WL 75453 (June 22, 1988).
109. Wachtell Lipton's response to this Essay downplays the significance of the Hyde
Park decision, and indeed does not identify the case by name or acknowledge that the
opinion was joined by then-Judge Breyer. See Wachtell Response, supra note 9 (referring
to the decision only in a hyperlink). In our view, Hyde Park-especially given that it was
joined by a judge who is now a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court-is a significant
decision that is likely to be part of the mix of considerations that will influence future
courts' assessments of the proper scope of the Williams Act.
110. See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55 (Del. Ch. 2011)
("[A]s Delaware law currently stands.., the power to defeat an inadequate hostile tender
offer ultimately lies with the board of directors.").
111. Compare, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028, 1030 (1982) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers] (" [F] acilitating competing tender offers is desirable both [for]
targets' shareholders and... society."), and Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819,
821 (1981) [hereinafter Gilson, The Case Against Defensive Tactics] (contending that
management should have a "substantially more limited role" than they have under current
law in determining whether a hostile tender offer should be accepted), with Lipton,
Takeover Bids, supra note 16, at 104 (arguing that short-term investors do not share the
"long-term interests of other shareholders and ... concern of corporate management with
the need for long-term planning").
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poses of the shareholder-autonomy view, however, the merits of that
debate are irrelevant. Instead, what is important is that courts applying a
shareholder-autonomy framework to the Williams Act have held that
state laws that limit investors' freedom to accept tender offers are
preempted. Because state-law poison-pill rules currently deprive share-
holders of the freedom to accept hostile tender offers, courts adopting
this approach can be expected to conclude that state-law rules governing
the poison pill are preempted.
B. Preemption Depends on Overall Effect on Shareholder Value
Some courts examining the preemptive scope of the Williams Act
have concluded that whether a particular state takeover law is preempted
depends on whether, in fact, the law enhances shareholder protection.
Under this approach, which emphasizes the shift in the Supreme Court's
analysis between MITE and CTS,1 l2 courts hold that the Williams Act
establishes a lower bound for shareholder protection in the tender-offer
context. The states are free, under this view, to provide additional pro-
tection for investors. But for state-law regulation of tender offers to sur-
vive Williams Act preemption, the evidence must indicate that the statute
generally protects investors-that is, that the law, on average, enhances
shareholder value.
Courts applying this approach to claims that the Williams Act
preempts state-law poison-pill rules will have to form a judgment on
whether state laws that give directors the power to permanently block
tender offers enhance shareholder value. Those defending these rules
would have to engage substantively with the costs of allowing manage-
ment to block tender offers, and particularly the possibility that permit-
ting management to do so increases agency costs and managerial slack-
and the accumulating evidence that these costs are significant. We note
that, for example, in a study coauthored by one of us, takeover targets
with staggered board elections-which are able to make the most effec-
tive use of state-law poison-pill rules in order to turn away hostile tender
112. The MITE Court expressly emphasized shareholder autonomy rather than
shareholder protection as a principal purpose of the Williams Act. Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (concluding that a state may not "offer[] investor protection at
the expense of investor autonomy" and therefore striking down a law that the state
characterized as providing investors with critical protection against coercive tender offers
(internal quotation marks omitted)). By contrast, the CTS Court held that states may
protect investors by depriving them of choice in the tender-offer context so long as the
"principal result" of the state law is to protect shareholders. CTS, 481 U.S. at 82 n.7; see
also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) ("The legislative history...
shows that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors who are
confronted with a tender offer."); Veere, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp.
1027, 1030 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (comparing the Court's opinions in MITE and CTS and
concluding that the CTS majority viewed the Williams Act "not as a guarantee of a level
playing field for offeror and management in the take-over game," "but as protection for
the investor while management and offeror are on the field").
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offers-provided lower returns to shareholders in the face of a takeover
bid." 3 These companies were able to use the power conferred upon
directors by state law to remain independent much more often than
companies that were less able to take advantage of those rules. The study
found that, on average, remaining independent reduced shareholder
value at these firms.1 4 Furthermore, another study coauthored by one of
us found that, going beyond takeover targets, companies with staggered
boards are generally associated with lower firm value."
5
Of course, a complete analysis of the empirical evidence on the
shareholder-value implications of empowering managers to block hostile
offers is beyond the scope of this Essay. We expect that this question will
be hotly debated if the federal courts adopt a shareholder-value
approach to Williams Act preemption in litigation over the constitution-
ality of state-law poison-pill rules. In the course of such litigation, the par-
ties will likely arrange for experts to opine on the effects of such state-law
rules on shareholder value, and the courts will have to review those opin-
ions as well as the extensive body of theoretical and empirical literature
on this question to determine whether, in the view of the court, state-law
poison-pill rules do, in fact, protect shareholders." 6
A comprehensive analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this
Essay. In previous work, one of us has presented a detailed review of the
overall effect of these rules on shareholders." 7 For purposes of this Essay,
we note only that, at a minimum, the arguments that state-law poison-pill
rules in fact reduce shareholder value should be taken seriously. In par-
ticular, the courts will have to consider the agency costs that result from
such rules, which insulate incumbent managers from the possibility of a
hostile takeover and thus give rise to considerable managerial slack. In
sum, if courts considering preemption challenges to state-law poison-pill
rules emphasize shareholder value, there is a substantial likelihood that
they will conclude that such rules are preempted.
113. See Bebchuk, Coates, & Subramanian, Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note
15, at 891 (reporting that effective staggered boards "reduced returns ... for shareholders
of hostile bid targets").
114. See id. at 891, 934-35 (finding that "the substantial increase in the likelihood of
remaining independent.., is rather costly for target shareholders").
115. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78J.
Fin. Econ. 409, 430 (2005) (reporting that the "reduction in firm value associated with
staggered boards is economically meaningful").
116. For early contributions to this literature, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
15, at 1164; see also, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers,
supra note 111, at 1031; Gilson, The Case Against Defensive Tactics, supra note 111, at
821-22; Lipton, Takeover Bids, supra note 16, at 102-04.
117. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 15, at 995-1026.
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C. Per Se Valid
The courts might also adopt an approach to Williams Act preemp-
tion that would lead them to conclude that state-law poison-pill rules are
generally not preempted. Under this view, the Williams Act preempts
only those state laws that directly conflict with the procedures mandated
by the Act. Thus, under this framework the Williams Act imposes virtually
no limits on the power that state law may give directors with respect to
tender offers. Although this approach would shield state-law poison-pill
rules from Williams Act preemption, as we explain below, few courts have
adopted it.
118
The judges who have adopted this framework have given three prin-
cipal reasons for interpreting the Williams Act's preemptive scope nar-
rowly. First, they note that, when Congress added the Williams Act to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the legislation did not remove a provi-
sion from the Exchange Act stating that nothing contained in the
Exchange Act "shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission
(or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any
security... insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chap-
ter," suggesting that Congress did not intend for the Williams Act to
preempt state law." 9 Second, they note that, in general, the federal
courts presume that state law is not preempted by federal law,
particularly in areas in which states have traditionally had significant
authority. 2 Finally, Judge Easterbrook has argued that the Williams Act
merely "regulates the process of tender offers," including "timing [and]
disclosure"; thus, only a state law that "alter[s] ... the procedures
118. As we have noted, Judge Frank Easterbrook described this approach in an
opinion for a unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit, see Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 498-99 (7th Cir. 1989), and in that opinion Judge
Easterbrook indicated that, under this view, state-law poison-pill rules "could [not] be
thought preempted" by the Williams Act, id. at 504. As noted above, the Fourth Circuit
adopted a similar view in WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172, 1180 (4th
Cir. 1995), and, in that case, rejected a broad challenge to a Virginia statute permitting
the adoption of rights plans. See supra note 49. Justice Antonin Scalia described a similar
view in a separate opinion in CTS, but no other justice joined that opinion. See CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2012); see also CTS, 481 U.S. at 96 (ScaliaJ., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("Unless it serves no function, that language
forecloses pre-emption on the basis of conflicting 'purpose' as opposed to conflicting
'provision."'); Amanda Acquisition, 877 F.2d at 502 (arguing that Williams Act
"[plreemption has not won easy acceptance among the Justices for several reasons,"
including 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)).
120. Amanda Acquisition, 877 F.2d at 502 ("Then there is the traditional reluctance of
federal courts to infer preemption of state law in areas traditionally regulated by the
States .... States have regulated corporate affairs, including mergers and sales of assets,
since before the beginning of the nation." (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S.
93, 101 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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governed by federal regulation" should be held preempted.12 ' A broader
approach, Judge Easterbrook has explained, would improperly lead
courts to question the constitutionality of basic state corporate-law rules
governing matters such as shareholder voting.
1 22
In the event that a preemption challenge to state-law poison-pill
rules reaches the Supreme Court, we do not expect that these arguments
will ultimately prevail.123 With respect to the claim that the Exchange
Act's provision preserving the authority of state securities agencies
reflects congressional intent to avoid preemption of state law, although
Justice Scalia described this view in a separate opinion in CTS, no other
Justice joined that opinion. To be sure, all eight of the Justices who
declined to join Justice Scalia's opinion in CTS have since been replaced.
Nevertheless, the fact that Justice Scalia's opinion drew no additional
support at the time CTS was decided suggests that this view is unlikely to
persuade a majority of today's Court. Furthermore, the language used in
the provision differs markedly from the language Congress customarily
uses to express its intent to avoid preemption of state law.
124
The provision's language and legislative history suggest that it was
intended simply to preserve state securities agencies' jurisdiction, not
limit the preemptive scope of federal securities law. 125 Moreover, even
121. Id. at 503-04.
122. Id. (arguing that, on a broader view of Williams Act preemption, state laws
governing shareholder voting could be preempted).
123. For purposes of this Essay, we put to one side whether this approach to Williams
Act preemption is normatively desirable, although other commentators have urged that
this view be adopted. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Constitutionality of the Delaware
Takeover Statute, ProfessorBainbridge.com (Nov. 10, 2009, 12:46 PM), http://www.
professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/1 1/the-constitutionality-of-the-
delaware-takeover-statute.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that
"courts today would follow Amanda Acquisition" rather than other approaches to Williams
Act preemption); see also Ribstein, supra note 7, at 790-92 (contending that using the
"meaningful opportunity for success" test would lead courts into a "daunting thicket" of
issues regarding the relationship between the Williams Act and state corporate law). For
present purposes, we note only that the doctrinal arguments presented in support of this
approach are in some tension with the text and legislative history of the Williams Act and
have not enjoyed widespread support among the courts.
124. When Congress intends to limit the preemptive scope of its acts, it typically does
so with standard language that explicitly protects state law from preemption rather than
language preserving the jurisdiction of state administrative agencies. For a recent
example, see Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314,
§ 231, 122 Stat. 3016, 3070 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (2012)) ("Nothing in this Act...
shall be construed to preempt or otherwise affect any warning requirement relating to
consumer products or substances that is established pursuant to State law....").
125. Adolph C. Johnson, the Chief Counsel of the Public Service Commission of
Wisconsin, suggested that this language be added to the Exchange Act in order to ensure
only that each state was "left with authority to regulate in accordance with its laws and
practices of persons engaged in strictly intrastate business within its borders," not to limit
the preemptive scope of the Williams Act. Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R.
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when Congress does employ standard language expressing an intent to
avoid preemption, the courts have increasingly concluded that ordinary
preemption analysis-including an assessment whether state law is an
obstacle to Congress's objectives-should still apply. 26 Thus, courts are
unlikely to conclude that this provision forecloses analysis whether state-
law poison-pill rules frustrate Congress's objectives with respect to the
Williams Act.
The courts are also unlikely to be persuaded to adopt a narrow view
of the Williams Act's preemptive scope by arguments that courts typically
presume that state law is not preempted by federal law, particularly in
areas-such as substantive corporate law-where the states have tradi-
tionally had significant authority. For one thing, it is far from clear that
the presumption against preemption, which has been the subject of con-
siderable criticism from several commentators, remains a valid principle
of constitutional law; 127 indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly
declined to apply the presumption in several recent cases. 121 Moreover,
while the States have traditionally had significant authority in the area of
corporate law, the Supreme Court has limited this presumption to areas
7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong. 669 (1934).
126. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (concluding
explicit federal antipreemption provision did not limit operation of ordinary preemption
principles).
127. The traditional formulation of the presumption is that the courts should "start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). If it continues to apply at all, the
presumption is limited to "field[s] which the States have traditionally occupied."
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). Commentators have variously criticized
the presumption for being unfaithful to the text of the Supremacy Clause, for inviting the
courts to disregard congressional intent to preempt state law, and for being applied
inconsistently. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L.J. 2085,
2092 (2000) (arguing that the presumption would "disrupt the constitutional division of
power between federal and state governments, rewrite the laws enacted by Congress, or
both"); Nelson, supra note 17, at 293 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause itself "rejects a
general presumption that federal law does not contradict state law"); see also Christopher
R. Drahozal, The Supremacy Clause: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution
115 (2004) (collecting criticisms). "In short, it seems that no one is happy with the
presumption except perhaps the Supreme Court itself." Id.
128. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001)
(holding, "in contrast to situations implicating federalism concerns and the historic
primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety[,] no presumption against pre-
emption obtains in this case" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Geier, 529 U.S. at 874 (refusing to apply "special burden" to those attempting to show
federal law preempts state law). The Court did apply the presumption in a more recent
case, see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009), but three Justices vigorously dissented
from its application, see id. at 604, 622-24 (Alito,J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has
"specifically rejected the argument... that the 'presumption against pre-emption' is
relevant" in cases involving preemption on the theory that state law frustrates the purposes
and objectives of federal law (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 906-07)).
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that involve the States' police powers, which are not implicated by state
regulation of corporate law. 129 Finally, although the Court has twice
addressed the preemptive scope of the Williams Act, none of the nine
opinions issued in those cases even mentioned this presumption. 3 0
It is also unlikely that the courts will be persuaded to limit the
preemptive reach of the Williams Act by Judge Easterbrook's view that
the Act merely prescribes federal procedures for tender offers and that
any state law that does not directly conflict with those procedures should
not be held preempted. Under this framework, virtually no state law-
including, for example, a punitive tax on tender offers-would be
preempted by the Williams Act. While this view is certainly consistent
with Justice Scalia's opinion in CTS, as we have noted, no other Justice
joined that opinion.
Moreover, this approach is inconsistent with the extensive analysis of
congressional intent joined by all eight of the other Justices in both
MITE and CTS.' None of that analysis-and similar analysis conducted
by nearly every federal court to consider the preemptive scope of the
Williams Act-would be necessary if this view were the law. And while
several Justices, and particularly Justice Thomas, have often urged that
the Court should not attempt to assess congressional purpose in preemp-
tion cases, a majority of the Court has consistently rejected that
argument.'32
In our view, the narrow approach to the Williams Act's preemptive
scope has not gained widespread support among federal courts because
this view rests upon an unusually formal distinction that leads to puzzling
results that are inconsistent with the Act's purpose. Specifically, this
approach would require courts to invalidate state laws with virtually no
influence on the frequency or operation of tender offers while giving the
states license to render the Williams Act a dead letter.
Suppose, for example, that a state adopted a law requiring a tender
offeror to close an offer within nineteen days after initiating the offer.
Because the Williams Act already mandates that such offers be kept open
129. Drahozal, supra note 127, at 113 ("The Court has not adopted a test for
identifying areas traditionally regulated by the states, but it has linked the requirement to
the state police power .... ).
130. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (separate opinions
of White, Powell & Scalia, JJ.); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (separate
opinions of White, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.).
131. See, e.g., CTS, 481 U.S. at 82-83; MITE, 457 U.S. at 631-34.
132. See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring in thejudgment) ("Pre-
emption analysis should not be a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute
is in tension with federal objectives" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2524 (2012) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I have explained that the 'purposes and
objectives' theory of implied pre-emption is inconsistent with the Constitution because it
invites courts to engage in freewheeling speculation about congressional purpose that
roams well beyond statutory text.").
1588 [Vol. 114:1549
THE POISON PILL AND THE CONSTITUTION
for twenty days, such a law would likely have a trivial effect on tender
offers, reducing the period during which offers are kept open byjust one
day. Courts adopting the narrow view of the Williams Act's preemptive
reach, however, would almost certainly invalidate such a law. As Judge
Easterbrook explained in Amanda Acquisition, even on a narrow view of
the Act's preemptive scope, state laws that are inconsistent with the
Williams Act's procedural requirements must fall.
133
On the other hand, state laws that would make the Williams Act vir-
tually irrelevant to the tender-offer landscape would be upheld under
this view. Suppose, for example, a state enacted a law authorizing a poi-
son pill providing that, on the day any shareholder makes an unsolicited
offer for control, that investor's shares are immediately cancelled for no
consideration, and the shareholder's stake becomes worthless. Suppose,
too, that most firms in this jurisdiction adopted such a pill. The effect of
this development would be to eliminate virtually all tender offers. Yet
because there is no direct conflict between that law and the "process of
tender offers," jurists taking a narrow approach to the preemptive scope
of the Williams Act would uphold such a law.1
3 4
In our view, an analysis of the Williams Act's relationship to state law
that would invalidate rules with a trivial influence on tender offers but
sustain laws that render the Act irrelevant to the tender-offer landscape is
unpersuasive. Such an approach ignores the important purpose served
by preemption doctrine and the Supremacy Clause itself: to prohibit the
States from interfering with federal policy in an area where Congress has
spoken. This view gives little weight to the objectives and purposes of the
Act-even though standard preemption analysis requires close analysis of
those considerations. 1
35
133. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 503-04
(7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that state laws cannot "tinker[] with any of the procedures
established in federal law") .
134. See id. (arguing that the Williams Act "regulates [only] the process of tender
offers").
135. As we have explained, see supra note 17, the courts have made clear that
conflict preemption exists where "either (1) compliance with both the state and federal law
is 'a physical impossibility' or (2) state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' Nelson, supra note 17, at
228 (emphases added) (quoting Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997)). Some
commentators have urged that this second category of preemption-requiring analysis of
the purposes and objectives of Congress-be curtailed or eliminated. See id. at 279 n.173.
A majority of the currentJustices of the Supreme Court have repeatedly rejected this view,
however, making clear that the Supremacy Clause requires courts to undertake careful
analysis of the objectives and purposes of Congress when examining preemption claims.
See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (setting forth
Justice Thomas's conclusion that he can "no longer assent to a doctrine that pre-empts
state laws merely because they 'stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives' of federal law," a view joined by no other
Justice (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
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For present purposes, however, the merits of a narrow approach to
federal preemption doctrine in general, and to Williams Act preemption
in particular, are not important. What is important is that this approach
has not carried the day among jurists considering preemption challenges
to state law based on the Williams Act. Thus, we think that the courts are
unlikely to adopt this approach should they systematically consider such
a challenge to state-law poison-pill rules. Although those rules would sur-
vive a constitutional challenge if the courts do adopt this framework, the
constitutionality of state-law poison-pill rules is much less certain under
the alternative approaches that the courts have used to address these
challenges.
IV. CHANGING STATE LAW TO AVOID PREEMPTION
Thus far we have taken current state-law poison-pill rules as given
and have shown that they might well be invalidated in the event that they
were challenged on preemption grounds. State-law rules, however, may
evolve-and, indeed, have evolved-considerably over time. Following
the invalidation of some state-law poison-pill rules--or if state lawmakers
recognize the risk that these rules will be invalidated-states may
consider altering their corporate law to avoid preemption. This Part
describes changes to state law that would make reviewing courts less
likely to conclude that the Williams Act preempts state-law poison-pill
rules.
Before proceeding, we note that a comprehensive analysis of the
alternative approaches that lawmakers might consider to state-law poison-
pill rules is beyond the scope of this Essay. In light of the significant risk
that the courts might hold current state-law poison-pill rules preempted
by the Williams Act, however, lawmakers may seek to alter state corporate
law to avoid preemption. Thus, this Part provides a preliminary assess-
ment of how lawmakers might shield state corporate law from the
Williams Act.
Although courts have taken a wide variety of approaches when
interpreting the preemptive scope of the Williams Act, most judges con-
sidering constitutional challenges to state antitakeover statutes have
focused on the length of time state law enables incumbents to block a
tender offer from reaching shareholders. For example, in MITE the
Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois statute challenged there was
We note that the narrow view of the Williams Act's preemptive scope advanced by
Judge Easterbrook suggests that the Act only preempts those state laws that make it
impossible for companies to comply with both the Act and the challenged state law. See
Amanda Acquisition, 877 F.2d at 504 (rejecting a challenge to a Wisconsin law because it did
"not... alter any of the procedures governed by federal regulation"). The Supreme Court
has made it clear, however, that federal law also preempts any state laws that stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purposes and objectives. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at
573-75. Thus, the narrow view of the Williams Act's preemptive scope is difficult to
reconcile with the Court's current preemption jurisprudence.
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preempted in part because of the "extended delay" that the law might
impose on the tender-offer process. 136 And the Court upheld the Indiana
statute challenged in CTS in part because the Justices were convinced
that the potential fifty-day delay imposed by that law was "reasonable." 3 7
Similarly, lower courts considering preemption challenges to state
antitakeover statutes have emphasized the period of time that state law
allows incumbents to delay a tender offer. For example, those courts that
have required state laws to provide bidders with a meaningful oppor-
tunity for success have suggested that, to preserve a meaningful oppor-
tunity for hostile bidders, state law must not impose such a lengthy delay
on tender offers that bidders would be deterred from proceeding.'38 And
the courts that have held that state laws must preserve some shareholder
autonomy with respect to tender offers have indicated that state laws that
impose lengthy delays compromise shareholders' freedom to decide
whether to accept an offer.
139
Moreover, we think that courts focusing on whether state takeover
law enhances or reduces shareholder value would be more likely to
uphold laws that do not empower directors to impose lengthy delays on
the tender-offer process. The principal costs that state-law poison-pill
rules impose upon investors are the agency costs that arise when incum-
bents use these rules to perpetuate themselves in office despite the pres-
ence of a hostile bidder. 4 ' It follows, then, that laws that permit incum-
bents to block hostile bids for lengthy periods of time will expose inves-
tors to more significant agency costs and thus will be less likely to
enhance shareholder value.
Taken together, in our view the cases interpreting the preemptive
scope of the Williams Act suggest that state-law poison-pill rules that limit
the period of time during which directors can use the pill to block a dis-
favored tender offer would be more likely to survive constitutional scru-
136. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637-38 ("In enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself
recognized that delay can seriously impede a tender offer, and sought to avoid it."
(quoting Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd,
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
137. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 82 n.7 (1987); see also id. at
85 (noting, by contrast, that the Illinois statute struck down in MITE had the "potential [to
impose] indefinite delay" on the tender-offer process).
138. See, e.g., BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 469 (D. Del. 1988)
(determining whether bidder has been given meaningful opportunity for success depends,
among other things, on whether state law "impose [s] an indefinite or unreasonable delay
on offers").
139. See, e.g., Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 852-53 (1st Cir. 1988)
(concluding that the Massachusetts law challenged in that case was likely preempted
because it "alter[ed] the balance between management and offerors in a manner that
ultimately... work[ed] to the detriment of investors").
140. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 792 (describing standard agency costs
that accompany use of poison pills).
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tiny. Thus, lawmakers seeking to shield these rules from preemption
should consider placing meaningful limitations on how long directors
may keep poison pills in place. For example, state law could stipulate that
a pill may be kept in place for only a specified period of time without
shareholder approval.
Although the precise scope of such time limits is beyond the scope
of this Essay, we note that corporate law in several jurisdictions outside
the United States limits the amount of time during which boards may use
a poison pill to block a tender offer from shareholder consideration. For
example, Canadian law provides that a poison pill may not be kept in
place without shareholder approval if regulators conclude that the pill
has given directors sufficient time to consider alternatives to the hostile
offer.'4 ' Similarly, Japanese law allows companies to adopt poison pills
only if there is some mechanism for shareholders to eliminate them,
including a sunset provision limiting the time during which the pill may
be kept in place without shareholder approval. 42 Thus, as experience in
other jurisdictions has shown, legal arrangements limiting the time
during which directors may use a poison pill to block a tender offer from
being considered by shareholders can be successfully implemented.
Indeed, even in the United States, many once believed that state law
would develop, over time, to require that poison pills include a mecha-
nism enabling shareholders to redeem poison pills after a limited period
of time. Anticipating that the law might move in that direction, in 1987
the creators of the original poison pill designed a second-generation pill
that allowed "qualified" bidders to call a special shareholder meeting
within 90 to 120 days following the bidder's request-and that provided
that shareholders could, by majority vote at the special meeting, redeem
the pill. 4 '
Of course, since 1987 state law has taken a different path, leading
practitioners to drop the special-meeting procedure from subsequent
versions of the pill. State law today authorizes incumbents to use the pill
to delay hostile offers for lengthy periods of time without shareholder
approval. As we have explained, however, this shift brings state-law
141. See, e.g., Canadian Jorex Ltd. (Re) (1992), 15 O.S.C. Bull. 257 (Can. Ont. Sec.
Com.) (holding that a poison pill has "outlived its usefulness" when directors have had
sufficient time to consider bid).
142. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, The Emerging Problem of Embedded Defenses:
Lessons from Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. UAL Corp., 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1243
(2007) (citing Ministry of Econ., Trade & Indus. & Ministry of Justice, Guidelines
Regarding Takeover Defenses for the Purposes of Protection and Enhancement of
Corporate Value and Shareholders' Common Interests 9 (2005)).
143. See Memorandum from M. Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to clients, A
Second Generation Share Purchase Rights Plan (July 14, 1987) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing this mechanism); see also Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance
in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 70 (1987) ("[T]he new pill
provides that, under certain circumstances, a special shareholders meeting will be held to
determine whether the pill should be redeemed.").
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poison-pill rules into significant tension with the Williams Act. Lawmak-
ers seeking to address that tension would do well to recall that the crea-
tors of the pill itself initially contemplated limits on the amount of time
that incumbents could use the pill to block a tender offer. By changing
state-law poison-pill rules to authorize the use of pills only for a limited
period of time, lawmakers could render the rules more likely to be held
consistent with the Williams Act.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we have challenged the widely shared view that the sig-
nificant line of cases in which federal courts reviewed the constitutional-
ity of state antitakeover laws is no longer practically relevant. We have
shown that, by contrast, the principles developed in these cases raise
serious questions about the validity of the state-law rules authorizing the
use of the poison pill, the antitakeover device that plays a key role in the
corporate landscape. We have conducted a systematic analysis of the
validity of these rules and have provided a framework for assessing
preemption challenges to them.
Our analysis indicates that challenges to the validity of state-law
poison-pill rules would likely have major consequences. We have shown
that such challenges could well result in the invalidation of the current
state-law rules governing poison pills on grounds of Williams Act
preemption. Furthermore, while state lawmakers could change these
rules to enable them to survive a preemption challenge, the changes
necessary to accomplish this-imposing significant limits on the length
of time during which incumbents may use a poison pill to block an unso-
licited offer-would themselves bring about major changes to how
American corporations are governed and acquired.
Either way, recognizing the tension between current state-law
poison-pill rules and the Williams Act could have profound implications
for the corporate landscape. We expect that litigation over these ques-
tions will have a significant effect on mergers and acquisitions practice,
the vigor with which the market for corporate control operates, and how
the possibility of a hostile offer affects the decisions of incumbent man-
agers and directors throughout American corporations. We hope that
our analysis will contribute to the recognition of this critical tension, and
that the framework we have developed will prove useful to scholars, law-
makers, and courts in their future examination of this important subject.
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